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Jack Thorlin

Law and Sampling Theory
20 U.N.H. L. Rev. 97 (2021)

Law involves a fundamental tradeoff, a sampling problem. In science, sampling
problems emerge when trying to understand something complicated by considering discrete,
manageable subsets of it—samples. When doing that, scientists must compromise between
accuracy and resource-expenditure. Perfect accuracy requires infinite resources, such as a
perfect digital image with infinite file size. Perfection being unattainable, scientists must decide
what level of accuracy is best for any given case. Every kind of law, from parking regulations to
criminal to high constitutional theory, is subject to the same dynamic.
Law’s sampling problem is the tradeoff between accurate representation of a community’s
moral preferences and the resources needed to understand those preferences and create specific,
enforceable rules based on them. To affect this tradeoff, legislators can create complicated
standards based on a diverse set of samples of the community’s moral feelings on a particular
issue. This approach is expensive in terms of resources but will more precisely conform to the
community’s moral preferences with plenty of exceptions for difficult cases. Alternatively,
legislators can create simple rules based on a more limited set of samples, risking unjust outcomes
in exchange for comprehensibility and simplicity. Which approach is better depends on the
circumstances of the problem.
Viewed through this prism, there are several categories of law where the justice system seems
to accord resources inefficiently, either by devoting tremendous resources to make small
adjustments to outcomes or skimping on resources in order to make penny-wise, pound-foolish
legal doctrines. When the justice system works inefficiently in this way, it is inevitably to the
benefit of some, whether by happenstance or design, at the expense of the many. When too many
resources are put into a particular task, the beneficiaries tend to be the businesses or
organizations involved in the legal system. When too few resources are invested, the beneficiaries
are entities who can manipulate the space between the approximation of justice and actual justice.
Examples abound across the legal world where this paradigm is a useful way to identify
injustice. This article examines several areas showing under- or over-investment of resources,
discusses possible reforms, and posits theories for why sampling failure persists in certain fields.
Areas of apparent over-investment include the rule against perpetuities and the Tarasoff rule.
Under-investment is evident in doctrines like felony murder and recent Supreme Court caselaw
involving the Free Exercise Clause.
ABSTRACT.

Jack Thorlin is an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center and a
United States Senate staffer.
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LAW AND SAMPLING THEORY

INTRODUCTION

Justice is an image in our mind—an ideal image of a world where people get
what they deserve. 1 We try to reproduce that image in reality through the legal
system. However, reproducing an image is only possible through a tradeoff: the
closer you get to perfect reproduction, the more resources must be poured into the
effort.2 In the engineering world, digital photography is a straightforward example
of this relationship. The more pixels used to reproduce an image, the more accurate
the representation seems. The number of pixels required to produce a passable
selfie is far less than the number required to produce, say, an artistic landscape
photograph. At some point determined by technology and available resources, the
required investment is no longer worth getting closer to perfection.
Justice works with very similar constraints at every level of the legal system.
From parking tickets to the highest echelons of constitutional law, there is a tradeoff
between accurately delivering justice and the resources required to unravel the
complexity of the situation. We have clear, simple rules where we can get relatively
accurate justice for a minimal investment of resources. For example, rules relating
to parking cars tend to require little complexity: “10-minute parking only.” There
are certainly foreseeable situations where justice would demand allowing someone
to park for 20 minutes, but either the benefit of flexibility is limited (e.g., there are
relatively few cases where 20 minutes would make a meaningful difference) or
enforcing a more flexible “park as long as reasonable” rule would require additional
resources (e.g., more parking spots are needed, or someone has to watch the spot
longer to detect violations.)
At the opposite extreme, we have nuanced, complicated rules where the cost of
deviating from perfect justice is high, and the number of cases where the rules come
into effect is relatively small. The legislative severability doctrine provides a

See Michael Sandel, Lecture 18: What’s the Purpose?, Harvard Univ. Just. with Michael
Sandel, http://justiceharvard.org/lecture-18-whats-the-purpose/#1477505898827-e5b8c263-0f21
[https://perma.cc/27RN-M5MG] (describing Aristotle’s view of justice being “giving people their
due, what they deserve.”).

1

To put the point slightly more scientifically, to perfectly reproduce a signal, one must sample
at twice the frequency of the highest frequency component of the signal that the sampler wants to
reproduce. So, for example, if one is sampling music, there is a frequency above which humans
cannot tell the difference. Sampling at twice that frequency creates a reproduction that human
ears cannot distinguish from the original, though in a real-world signal, the highest frequency is
infinitely high, so perfectly recovering the signal is not possible. Cf. Renato Seeber & Alessandro &
Ulrici, Analog and Digital Worlds: Part 1. Signal Sampling and Fourier Transform, 2:18 ChemTexts 1, 3
(2016), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs40828-016-0037-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LWF5-3HBB].
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clear example. Severability addresses how and whether courts should sever
unconstitutional provisions from otherwise constitutional laws. The current test is
highly abstract, asking courts to try to envision whether Congress would have
passed the law without the unconstitutional part.3 This rule is clearly not easy to
administer but it only comes up in a few cases. In those few cases, it is tremendously
important to get the outcome right because those individual cases affect hundreds
of millions of people. An obvious recent example is the Affordable Care Act, which
would have been struck down in its entirety if not for severability.4
Several useful conclusions emerge from this way of looking at resource
tradeoffs in the legal system. First, because nearly infinite resources are required
to create perfect justice, it is practically impossible to create a perfectly just law.
Second, the optimal level of investment changes with circumstances. It is not at all
contradictory to say that certain legal rules were correct for the time they were
implemented but leaving them in place now or in the future would be a mistake.
Third, determining the best legal rule to address a given issue depends on overall
resource allocation. It may be perfectly reasonable to address injustice in one area
before injustice in another, either because technology might soon reduce the costs
in some areas more than others, or because some areas might be closer to inflection
points, where small additional investments could yield major gains in justice.
There are many examples where our legal system handles the sampling problem
well, but we can use the sampling theory insight to spot areas in need of reform by
finding outliers—high-sampling areas that seem to receive outsized resources, or
low-sampling areas where major outcomes depend on simple rules and relatively
little investigation of relevant facts. These outlier areas warrant additional scrutiny.
In many cases, we can find some combination of conventional causes for poor
resource allocation: the benefits of the poor allocation are focused while the costs
are distributed, powerful political interests demand the continued level of
allocation, or the people who would benefit from change lack either the capacity or
will to seek it out.
Sampling theory is a middle ground between two views of law, one focused on
morality and one focused on efficiency. One argument against, say, capital
punishment is that it is morally repugnant to kill. 5 An argument for capital

While there are certainly critics of that doctrine, those critics generally suggest replacing it
with something equally nebulous, such as severing as little as possible without creating
devastating practical consequences.

3

4

See California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).

See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology,
and the Death penalty, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 755 (2005) (objecting to consequentialist arguments

5
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punishment is that it deters crime.6 These arguments largely waltz past each other
because they both ignore context in order to focus on isolated data points—namely,
whether capital punishment accords with a particular morality or whether there is
a utilitarian argument for it. This leaves both sides open for criticism. Most ethical
systems allow killing under some circumstances, and no society deters crime so
monomaniacally that it kills in response to every crime. To determine the best law,
sampling theory requires us to look at both sides of the argument in more detail.
Assuming capital punishment deters, how much does it deter? How many people
actually believe capital punishment is morally wrong? To judge whether capital
punishment should be replaced requires the holistic view that sampling theory
offers.
While sampling theory uses some of the insights of legal and economic
philosophy, sampling theory corrects a tendency on the part of the law and
economics movement to neglect or belittle moral intuition in favor of more objective
efficiency calculations.7 All other things being equal, efficiency is a good thing, of
course. But the term “efficiency” is meaningless without further definition. A law
that contradicts society’s moral intuition but expends relatively few resources
relative to its enforcement effect is no more efficient than a spaceship with no life
support system for passengers. Such a spaceship would go further with less fuel,
but it would not serve the purpose of a spaceship. Similarly, a law that is efficient
in resources but scorned by the community governed by it does not serve the
purpose of law.
I.

SAMPLING IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM

To understand the sampling problem in law, we need a firm understanding of
both law and sampling. Most readers of a legal journal understand law, but for these
purposes it is necessary to peer under the hood of law to see its connection to moral
thought. This may sound like airy philosophizing, but it is actually practical
engineering. Just as an engine can fail in many ways, there are multiple paths
toward failure in law. The sampling problem has its origins right at the juncture of
morality and law, so we must dip our toes into philosophical and psychological
about the death penalty on grounds that such arguments “evade[] and fail[] even to acknowledge
long-standing and widely discussed deontological objections to capital punishment qua
punishment”).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 705-06 (2005) (asserting that government
has a moral duty to impose capital punishment if it would maximize societal utility).

6

7

See, e.g., id. at 706.
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realms to understand what can go wrong.
A. Sampling Generally
Sampling is a way of taking something of great complexity and breaking it
down into more comprehensible parts so that it can be copied, edited, or otherwise
analyzed. Sampling theory arose in the context of signal processing because
engineers wanted to reproduce analog signals digitally.8 A signal in general means
a time-varying quantity conveying some sort of information. A sound wave, for
example, varies the speed of vibration of some medium (for us, air). A radio wave
varies voltage over time. Analog signals are the actual information of the universe—
for example, every individual color, smell, or sound in nature. They are continuous,
infinitely variable (i.e., you can always make a new one through a tiny tweak to an
existing one), and often extremely complicated. Digital signals are man-made,
composed of discrete chunks that are easy to analyze and reproduce.
There is no grand mystery to the concept of sampling, but it is ubiquitous. To
represent something complicated in a simpler form, one must “sample” the original
subject by taking in some information about it, then make assumptions to connect
the samples together and form a simpler reproduction of the original thing.
1.

The Basics

Perhaps the simplest example of sampling is pixels in a digital image. When we
take digital pictures, our camera is reading the color and intensity of light at many
individual spots in the lens.9 A computer can recognize the wavelength as being a
certain color and brightness, and displays each spot as an individual pixel of that
color on a screen. Each pixel represents one sample of the light reflected off the
subject of the picture. There are obvious assumptions that connect the samples
together: put each pixel at the relative location where the sample of light was taken,
limit the range of colors recognized by the computer to those within the human
visual spectrum, etc. The result is a simpler reproduction of what the subject of the
photograph looked like.
Moving from digital photography to the more abstract, sampling begins with a
desire to replicate some limited aspect of a subject. To build that replication, we
need a sampling mechanism—some instrument, whether our own eyes, a device, or

See The IEEE Signal Processing Society, Going Digital: The 1960s, in Fifty Years of Signal
Processing: The IEEE Signal Processing Society and its Technologies 1948-1998 14 (1998).

8

See generally LiveScience, How do Digital Cameras Work?
https://www.livescience.com/33789-digital-cameras-work-llmmp.html
[https://perma.cc/6YWN-BMDB].

9
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a survey to gather discrete data points regarding the aspect of the subject we are
interested in. That method is limited by the resources needed to take samples.
Resources can mean anything scarce, including time, computing power, energy, or
the materials required to use a certain instrument. After the samples are taken, we
need a model of some kind to fill in the blanks between data points. Finally, we are
left with a reproduction that is similar to but inevitably simpler than the original
subject.
Fig. 1: The Generalized Sampling Process

Note that most samples are only taking in one aspect of the thing in question
because the model being built serves a specific purpose. A digital photograph is
building a replica of what a subject looks like to the human eye. It is not building a
complete replica of the thing itself. To do that would require several different kinds
of samples—a sample of its texture to reproduce its feel, a measurement of its
weight (a sample of its weight at a specific time), some understanding of its smell,
etc. Deciding what aspect of the subject we want to sample depends on what we
want our replica to do. For a digital photograph, we just want to reproduce the
appearance of something we saw. If we were making a video, we might want to
reproduce the three-dimensional shape and texture.
2. Accuracy of Replication Depends on the Quality and Number of
Samples
To reproduce a subject, we need samples, and there is a mathematically defined
relationship between the complexity of a subject and the number of samples needed
to replicate it.10 This sounds like a more complicated idea than it really is. We all

This is the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem. It is most often used in signal processing,
but the same principles apply to something like digital image sampling, which is why I have
altered the phrasing somewhat (i.e., speaking of reproducing a “subject” instead of reproducing a
“signal. See, e.g., Nyquist-Shannon Sampling Theorem, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/

10
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understand the idea of unrepresentative samples in political polling. If you want to
know who will win an election, and you poll only voters who work for one of the
candidates, your poll—meant to be a simplified replica of the views of the general
electorate—will be inaccurate. Similarly, you might have an appropriately
randomized poll, but you only ask five voters, so random chance plays too large a
role in the model, and once again the poll is inaccurate.11 The representativeness of
the sample and number of samples both matter for the accuracy of the
reproduction.
This familiar issue exists in all sampling problems. There is an ancient Indian
parable where several blind men try to identify an elephant through touch.12 One
touches the trunk and thinks it is a snake. Another touches the ear and thinks it is a
fan. Another touches the leg and thinks it is a tree. This is a classic sampling
problem: too few samples, not representative of the whole. In a more modern
example, we have all seen a “pixelated” photo, where the human eye is not fooled
into thinking the pixels form a continuous image. This happens because there are
too few pixels—too few samples of the original subject. The more samples/pixels,
the closer the image will resemble the original subject.
3. Complex Subjects Require More Samples
One important aspect of sampling is that the number of samples necessary to
accurately reproduce a subject depends on the complexity of the subject itself.13 The
parable above uses an elephant because it is a complicated creature. If the blind men
were all trying to touch a snake, they might all have correctly identified the subject
based on their limited perspective. Similarly, if your spouse texts and asks you to
take a picture of a blank wall to identify the paint color, the picture you take needs
very few samples/pixels to convey all the necessary information. If you are taking a
picture of a rash on your child to send to a doctor, the picture needs many
samples/pixels to serve a medical diagnostic purpose.
The need for more samples to account for greater complexity can be generalized
to any sampling problem, not just digital pictures. Recall the famous scene in
The Shining where Jack Nicholson’s character has written “all work and no play make

wiki/Nyquist%E2%80%93Shannon_sampling_theorem [https://perma.cc/UM7B-U7P3] (last
updated July 6, 2021, 8:42 AM).
See generally Sampling, Nat’l Libr. Med., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/nichsr/stats_tutorial/
section2/mod1_sampling.html [https://perma.cc/K56N-7PDG].

11

See, e.g., The Blind Men and the Elephant, Peace Corps, https://www.peacecorps.gov/
educators/resources/story-blind-men-and-elephant/ [https://perma.cc/N33L-F3CG].

12

13

See supra note 11.
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Jack a dull boy” on his typewriter thousands of times. 14 The resulting “novel”
authored by his character has very little complexity. One could accurately reproduce
the meaning of the novel by “sampling” the sentence once, then repeating it
thousands of times. Compare that novel to, say, The Great Gatsby. It does not
contain anywhere near the same level of repetition. If you wanted to reproduce it,
you have no option but to transcribe every letter, sampling hundreds of thousands
of times.
Knowing that a greater number of samples yields a more accurate
reconstruction, why do we not always take the maximum possible number? The
answer is simple: resource scarcity. The most important scarcity for any particular
sampling problem varies, but taking a sample always requires some expenditure,
whether of energy, time, manpower, or some other finite resource. With digital
pictures, more pixels require a more sensitive, complicated camera system, as well
as more digital storage. At some point, devoting more money and manpower to
creating cameras with more pixels that people can barely notice becomes pointless,
or at least not efficient given the opportunity cost of devoting so much to the
problem. To generalize the point, deciding what resources to devote to a sampling
problem depends on three factors: (1) how complicated the subject is; (2) how costly
it is to sample; and (3) how much utility could be gained by changing the sampling
level.
4. The Quality of the Model Can Affect the Number of Samples
Required
The model that takes samples and uses them to replicate the subject amounts to
an algorithm. In some cases, it is very simple, as with pixels. There, the algorithm,
boiled down, is: “take the information from the light detector, see what color it
corresponds to, put that color down into a grid location corresponding to the
detector’s location on the lens.” In the case of political polling, a model might be
something like: “people in ethnic group X represent Y percent of the electorate, and
Z percent of our survey samples. Our results must be adjusted to account for the
difference between Y and Z.”
A good model can cut the number of samples required to reproduce the subject.
Sometimes, the models are so simple that we barely consider them, but they are
present nevertheless. Consider the “all work and no play” book from The Shining
again.15 Tasked with reproducing it, you sample the one sentence. Your model for
reproduction is to replicate the letters and words in the sentence, then repeat several
14

The Shining (Stanley Kubrick 1980).

15

Id.
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thousand times. Your model carries at least one key assumption: you are interested
only in the words that comprise the book, not, for example, any erratic spacing
between letters and words or the exact font of the typewriter. If you want to
replicate those aspects, you need more samples, and those samples would cover
other data (e.g., the specific details of each letter, the appearance of the letters, etc.).
There are even more basic assumptions at work, things that barely rise to the level
of conscious consideration. For example, you understand that the novel is written
in English, so you know the letters go left to right, down the page, so you do not need
to “sample” the exact position of the letters to accurately reproduce the novel.
5. Sampling is Everywhere
Because sampling is the primary means of reproducing the natural world in
ways we can understand, the sampling process as I have described it shows up in
countless places in the engineering and scientific worlds. Many forms of electronic
communication and media storage depend on sampling. 16 Virtually every social
science field involving statistics depends on sampling. 17 But sampling is also
present in less technical pursuits. For instance, the human mind itself might build
concepts in childhood through sampling.18 Businesses understand their customers
through sampling.19 Given that backdrop, it should not be surprising that law also
depends on sampling. Armed with an understanding of sampling theory, we can
now return to the legal issue at hand: how to map moral intuition into the legal
See, e.g., Russell Hoppenstein, Why RF Sampling, Tex. Instruments (June 29, 2015),
https://training.ti.com/why-rf-sampling [https://perma.cc/M23K-K3BB] (discussing radio
frequency sampling).

16

See, e.g., R. Mark Sirkin, Statistical Inference and Tests of Significance, in Statistics for the
Social Sciences 1, 2 (3d ed. 2006).

17

The prototype theory of cognition argues that human categorization of things into concepts
itself is a kind of sampling, building statistical information about like things and building a
prototype of the category based on that information. For example, a person might encounter 10
different kinds of birds before having a firm “bird” category, and the prototype might be
something like a sparrow based on the most common size, color, sound, and behavior of the 10
kinds of birds. That rough prototype can be further refined by a better, more complex
understanding of the kinds of birds. Flamingos and penguins are also birds, but we encounter
them rarely and they differ in many ways from the prototype bird, so our minds require a larger
sample and a more refined model of what makes a bird before one can fit them comfortably into
the category. Daniel A. Weiskopf, The Theory-Theory of Concepts, Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/th-th-co/ [https://perma.cc/R6WF-VLHD].

18

See, e.g., Audra Bianca, The Advantages of Statistics in Business, Chron (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/advantages-statistics-business-18698.html
[https://perma.cc/L5TD-8L7J].

19
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system.
B. Sampling Moral Intuition to Build Laws
Law can be thought of as a reproduction, based on samples. It is recreating
moral intuition for the purpose of creating a more just society. “Moral intuition” is
a catch-all term for our ethical feelings about outcomes that we have the power to
change. 20 We want to create a system of rules that will lead to the correct
outcomes—that is, the outcomes that correspond with our moral intuition.
Through data, journalism, word-of-mouth, professors thinking hard, and many
other mechanisms, we take in society’s moral intuition about ethical questions.
This yields samples: cases, statistics, or even hypotheticals. Lawmakers use those
samples to construct laws through the legislative process, and the
investigative/prosecutorial system enforces those laws pursuant to its own process.
The law we all ultimately follow is the text, as mediated through enforcement, from
police through the prosecutorial system and into punishments.21 A fundamental
conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that optimal laws, far from being
permanent in all civilizations at all times, depend on the status of each part of the
sampling system.
Fig. 2: Sampling in Law

1.

The Subject: Moral Intuition

“Moral intuition” is the innate feeling of right and wrong that drives rulemaking

See generally John Allman & Jim Woodward, What are Moral Intuitions and Why Should We Care
about Them? A Neurobiological Perspective, 18 Phil. Issues, Interdisciplinary Core Phil. 164, 164
(2008).

20

See Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes’ Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later,
49 Fla. L. Rev. 353, 367 (1997) (noting the positivist view that unenforced law is not law).

21
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in humans.22 It may seem obvious that such feelings drive rulemaking, but it should
comfort us in our assumptions that the available evidence suggests the earliest
human laws emerged from conscious attempts to reproduce moral intuition, as
supposedly revealed by ancient divinities.23 It is widely assumed by anthropologists
that unwritten rules existed long before written law, with some scholars arguing
capital punishment is at least 45,000 to 80,000 years old.24 Some kind of formal law
existed by around 6000 BCE,25 the first written code we know of dates from around
3000 BCE,26 and the earliest legal code we still have today was written around 2100
BCE.27 All of the known ancient codes were explicitly tied to religious belief, and
there was no clear distinction between human and divine justice.28 As one scholar
wrote of ancient Egyptian law, ancient codes were “based on a common-sense view
of right and wrong.” 29 Still, those codes seemed to be based on an attempt at
sampling and reproduction: “[l]aw emerged as a mechanism to maintain [religious
justice] on earth.”30
Other animals may have some forms of moral intuition. Some herd animals seem to enforce
rules, though it is obviously not possible to determine whether we should call them “rules” or some
kind of instinctual reaction to others in the group. This is too complicated a question for this
article, but it is worth noting that the basics of rule formation may extend beyond humans. See,
e.g., Dr. Kari Morfeld, The Role of the Matriarch Elephant, For Elephants (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.4elephants.org/blog/article/the-role-of-the-matriarch-elephant
[https://perma.cc/QKU8-FCVH] (discussing the role of matriarch elephants in enforcing herd
rules). But see Michael Tomasello, Becoming Human: A Theory of Ontogeny 3–4 (2019)
(arguing that moral identity is a uniquely human trait).

22

See generally Peter J. Hill, The Religious Origins of the Rule of Law, 16 J. of Institutional Econ.
305, 306 (2020).

23

Christopher Boehm, Prehistoric Capital Punishment and Parallel Evolutionary Effects, 10 Minding
Nature 23, 24 (2017) (“Because of psychopaths alone, we humans surely have been resorting to
capital punishment for at least 45,000 to 80,000 years or more, depending on when you believe
we became behaviorally modern and, hence, morally modern.”).

24

ITZCHAK E. KORNFELD, Mesopotamia: A History of Water and Law, in The Evolution of the Law
and Politics of Water 21, 25 (2009).

25

26

Id. at 24.

NJ van Blerk, The Emergency of Law in Ancient Egypt: The Role of Maat, 24:1 Fundamina 69, 73
(2018).

27

See, e.g., Hammurabi, The Code of Hammurabi, Yale Lillian Goldman L. Libr. (L. W.
King trans., 2015), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp [https://perma.cc/D82QLFME] (describing Hammurabi’s mission from the god Marduk to “give the protection of right to
the land.”).

28

29

See NJ van Blerk, supra note 27, at 70.

30

Id. at 71.
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Legal philosophers argue law has its origins in a “popular spirit, a common
conviction of right.”31 In these ancient instances of lawmaking, religion created that
common conviction. Kings then had to attempt to create laws embodying the
conviction. Today, relatively few legal codes are explicitly based on religion, but
“common conviction of right” continues to provide the motivational force behind
law. Several millennia of philosophers have failed to agree on what moral intuition
we should have, but we do not need to have a complete understanding of moral
intuition in order to discuss its role as the thing being sampled in the legal system.
Suffice to say, people have moral intuition in the same way they have preferences
for Pepsi or Coke, with the main difference being that they care far more about
moral intuition.
Even after reducing moral intuition to a simple matter of preference, moral
intuition has a number of difficult aspects that make sampling difficult. First, every
person has their own moral intuition, and even an individual’s moral intuition may
change over time as they accumulate their own experiences. While there is
obviously considerable overlap—virtually no one approves of murder—there are
inevitable disagreements, and any legal system must figure out sustainable ways of
dealing with them. In the United States, we have a broadly democratic system as a
guide for handling moral intuition in areas where a sufficient number of people
agree.
The second major complication in modeling moral intuition is that human
beings have known cognitive handicaps, which ultimately means we might change
our minds when we see what our initial moral intuition leads to. For example,
researchers reliably find that people do not handle probability or statistics well,
especially when dealing with abstract large numbers.32 Knowing that our cognitive
handicaps can lead our moral intuition astray and produce outcomes no one wants,
we sometimes need to consciously value some moral intuitions over others. For
instance, throwing away certain chemicals seems fine given the vastness of nature,
and we have a general moral intuition that people should be able to do what they
want with their property. However, if those chemicals in the aggregate lead to
abstract health risks like increased susceptibility to cancer, most people agree the
initial moral intuition against intrusion on property rights is not significant, and we
should regulate disposal of the chemical. In order to ultimately satisfy moral
intuition, we must also deal in meta-moral intuition—rules for ignoring or
Edwin W. Patterson, Historical and Evolutionary Theories of Law, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 681, 687
(1951).

31

See Ilyse Resnick et al., Dealing with Big Numbers: Representation and Understanding of Magnitudes
Outside of Human Experience, 41 Cognitive Science 1020, 1020 (2016).

32
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overruling ordinary moral intuition in situations where it would otherwise lead to
worse outcomes.
These are not insurmountable problems. The necessity of some kind of law
means that every society has methods for its creation. An absolute dictatorship
might be guided by the moral intuition of a dictator (or that dictator’s selfish
attempt to replicate the moral intuition of her people to keep her power). The
underlings in such a system then must sample from the dictator’s moral intuition to
put her will into practice. Western democracies have their own methods for
distilling moral intuition through elected representatives, who act based on a
complicated mixture of ambition, their own personal moral intuition, and their
representation of the moral intuition of a majority of their constituents. Whatever
the system, once the moral intuition guiding lawmaking is established, then the
sampling must begin.
2. Resources in the Legal System
In the legal system, there are several layers of resource issues that limit the use
of sampling to solve a moral problem through law. The overall level of wealth in a
society is the first and most obvious resource issue. The closer one gets to a
subsistence economy, the less surplus there is to pay for a complicated legal system.
If nearly everyone must work in agriculture for the society to feed itself, fewer
people can be police, guards, lawyers, or judges. There is ample empirical support
for these commonsense observations— imprisonment was far rarer in ancient
communities than today.33
A lack of resources overall means fewer samples can be taken or considered in
constructing the model of law. Law enforcement entities, to the extent they even
formally existed, could not easily catch criminals. Entirely consistent with
deterrence theory, when people did catch a criminal, the penal systems relied on
torture and death. Even so, levels of violent death were far greater, suggesting that
deterrence of crime through modern systems is now far more successful.34 Torture
and routine use of the death penalty do not adhere closely to moral intuition, but
Mary K. Stohr et al., Correctional History Ancient Times to Colonial Jails, in CORRECTIONS: A
TEXT/READER 55, 57–58 (2019) (describing ancient jails as being rudimentary and designed
primarily for holding the accused until a judgment was made or implemented).
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Max Roser, Ethnographic and Archaeological Evidence on Violent Deaths, Our World in Data
(2013), https://ourworldindata.org/ethnographic-and-archaeological-evidence-on-violentdeaths [https://perma.cc/2NFL-5SC3] (showing estimates of share of deaths from violence at
prehistoric archaeological sites as generally declining over time from a peak of 60 percent at a site
of the Crow Creek Native Americans in South Dakota from around 1325 CE to a low of 0.04 percent
worldwide in 2007).
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they are cheaper than imprisonment and psychological assistance. 35 The
“infrequent detection, maximum punishment” solution is a classic low sampling
strategy. It uses few resources, and does not closely hew to moral intuition.
Overall resources are not the only limitation on sampling. Wealthier societies
sometimes also adopt low-sampling strategies because they cannot (or choose not
to) connect their resources to the sampling needs of a particular legal issue. Politics
is the major factor limiting resource availability in a wealthy society. Use of the
word “politics” is not meant to be pejorative here—it merely means that the way
resources are allocated in the society might not allow for higher sampling in some
fields. We might view the reasoning behind the resource allocation as suspect, but
it may be a necessary negative consequence of a generally better way of
administering a society. For example, democracy has historically been more
efficient at resource allocation than many competing systems of government. 36
However, if voters hold a certain bias—say, against Black drug users as opposed to
white drug users—their elected representatives may opt for low sampling solutions
to address drug crimes by Blacks.37 This is a prototypical political limit on resource
allocation. The society could afford a more nuanced high sample system, but
chooses not to.
Not all political limitations on resources are the result of society-wide
preferences. Special interests may succeed in bribing or lobbying representatives
to underinvest in particular areas of law. Less nefariously, representatives may
simply have their own preferences, and the electorate may not care enough to vote
such representatives out of office.
In the short run, higher sampling—more nuanced rules, better enforcement,

Some research indicates the outlawing of torture is tied even more strongly to
democratization than economic wealth, suggesting humans do not generally condone torture
even outside of current western thought. See Christopher J. Einolf, The Fall and Rise of Torture: A
Comparative and Historical Analysis, Socio. Theory 101, 115 (June 2007) (“Both in the West and in
the developing world, democratic countries are much less likely to use torture than
nondemocratic countries, and this is true even when other relevant factors, such as the level of
economic development, are controlled for.”).

35

Cf. Rita Yi Man Li & Tat Ho Leung, Is Democracy a Pre-Condition in Economic Growth? A
Perspective from the Rise of Modern China, UN Chron., https://www.un.org/en/chronicle
/article/democracy-pre-condition-economic-growth-perspective-rise-modern-china
[https://perma.cc/CD79-W4AB] (“In general, democracy creates better opportunities for both
economic growth and cultural progress than authoritarian regimes.”).

36

See Deborah J. Vagins, Cracks in the System: 20 Years of the Unjust Federal Crack Cocaine Law,
ACLU (Oct. 2006), https://www.aclu.org/other/cracks-system-20-years-unjust-federal-crackcocaine-law [https://perma.cc/6RV6-QYG3].
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better investigation—requires at least sufficient (and sufficiently trained) lawyers,
police, judges, psychologists, and jury members. Obtaining those human resources
may ultimately seem reducible to an economic resources problem. If society needs
more judges, the legislature can allocate more funding for hiring more judges.
However, some kinds of resources are less responsive to increased financial
investment. If jury nullification is a rampant problem, one cannot simply “buy”
better jurors. Even if everyone agreed on how people should think about ethical
issues, we do not have sufficient understanding of education to know precisely how
to teach jurors or others to think the way we want them to.38
3. Samples and Sampling Mechanisms
The notion of a “sample” of moral intuition may sound airily metaphorical, but
it is actually quite simple. A sample of moral intuition is a discrete emotional data
point taken from the sea of human experience. It can take the form of a particular
case, a hypothetical, or a statistic amalgamating some aspect of many stories. It is,
of course, impossible to fully experience moral intuition directly, but through
empathy we humans can vicariously understand the moral intuition behind the
samples.
The fact that it is impossible to gather samples for all moral intuition in the
lawmaking process makes the sampling mechanism vitally important to obtaining
good laws. This aspect of legal sampling is arguably the most divorced from the
engineering world of sampling, where the sampling mechanism is usually simple,
mechanical, and regular. In our earlier example of digital images, the sampling
mechanism is a light sensor that detects light at a certain interval.39
In lawmaking, many different sampling mechanisms are operating all at once.
Lawmakers receive statistics, anecdotes, and hypotheticals from all manner of
sources: relatively neutral entities like the Bureau of Labor Statistics, think-tanks
that specialize in a particular issue area, lobbyists who present a deliberately onesided view, and a variety of constituents running the gamut from earnest to totally
insane. These can all be good or bad sampling mechanisms. While the natural
instinct may be that statistics are reliable and lobbyists cannot be trusted, there are
times when experts in a particular industry recognize a trend before it shows up in
For example, the U.S. experience in Afghanistan strongly suggests an inability to create a
nation-state from a population that prefers tribe-based affiliation. See generally S. Yaqub
Ibrahimi, Afghanistan’s Political Development Dilemma: The Centralist State Versus a Centrifugal Society,
14:1 J. S. Asian Dev. 40 (2019).

38

See Kenneth R. Spring et al., Digital Image Sampling Frequency, Olympus,
https://www.olympus-lifescience.com/en/microscope-resource/primer/java/digitalimaging/
processing/samplefrequency/ [https://perma.cc/AM3F-F5B].
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statistics. Just because the lobbyists have self-interest in a particular story does not
mean they are always wrong, but the lack of public trust in lobbyists naturally affects
the perceived legitimacy of their samples.
Another wrinkle in sampling mechanisms is that some lawmakers may want a
biased sample if they feel their constituents want them to create certain laws
regardless of the precise underlying facts. As discussed earlier, reproduction of a
subject through sampling depends on what aspect of the subject we want to
reproduce. A morally upright lawmaker might want samples representative of the
whole of the population, with no bias of any kind. To that lawmaker, a sampling
mechanism that only brought samples of, say, pleasant interactions between police
and citizens would be a “bad” sampling mechanism. However, if a lawmaker wants
to stop legislation to reform police activities, that mechanism would be “good.”
Congress provides many examples of deliberately selected samples driving the
lawmaking process. An undocumented immigrant with a criminal record shot and
killed an American woman in San Francisco in 2015. 40 The incident provoked
predictable moral intuitions: outrage over the killing, sadness over the needless
death, desires for safety and vengeance. 41 This event incensed people who had
already become strongly anti-undocumented immigrants. Legislators who either
shared their views or wanted to curry their favor began drafting bills that would
more harshly treat undocumented immigrants with criminal records.42 Note that
the “sample” in this case is a story, a particular rendition of the events that took
place. The sample is the part of moral intuition that actually factors into the
lawmaking process, not the actual truth of the matter. This sample, for instance,
omits a number of details that blunt or complicate moral intuition. The
undocumented immigrant’s criminal record was entirely based on nonviolent

See Julia Preston, San Francisco Murder Case Exposes Lapses in Immigration Enforcement, N.Y.
Times (July 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/us/san-francisco-murder-caseexposes-lapses-in-immigration-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/432K-PUQ2].

40

See, e.g., Gregory Korte, Trump says he’ll make Kate Steinle’s killer a 2020 campaign issue, USA
Today (Dec. 1, 2017, 9:17 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/01/trumpsays-hell-make-kate-steinles-killer-2020-campaign-issue/912603001/
[https://perma.cc/W52R-F94E].

41

See, e.g., Kristine Phillips, The story behind ‘Kate’s Law’ – and how it could change immigration
policies in the U.S., Wash. Post. (June 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/06/29/the-story-behind-kates-law-and-how-it-could-change-immigrationpolicies-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/63QX-A4UY].
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crime.43 He had found the gun under a bench and, according to him, accidentally
fired three shots, none aimed at the victim, and one ricocheted into her.44 Another
issue is whether the sample is representative. There are certainly any number of
other samples of moral intuition that would evoke sympathy for undocumented
immigrants.45
The above example shows the inherent connection between samples and
sampling mechanisms in the modern lawmaking process. Political polarization
may start through different moral intuition—genuinely different reactions, say, to
the moral status of an undocumented immigrant. At the outset, the parties are
more likely to be looking at similar samples. One side might focus on the humanity
of the migrant, and one focus more on having a controlled and orderly immigration
process, but the samples do not radically diverge so much as they simply focus more
on one aspect of intuition than another. The polarization process intensifies when
people seeking validation of their intuition deliberately use sampling mechanisms
to produce increasingly unrepresentative samples.46 In the immigration context,
this is why conservative outlets produce a story every time an undocumented
immigrant commits a crime,47 and why liberal outlets point out good deeds done by
undocumented immigrants.48
At some level, every sampling mechanism in the legal process comes down to
lobbying—being paid to connect lawmakers with a particular sample of moral

See Jonah Owen Lamb, Trial of man charged with murder of Kate Steinle set to begin, San
Francisco Exam. (July 13, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/trial-of-mancharged-with-murder-of-kate-steinle-set-to-begin/ [https://perma.cc/67Y3-UGDK].

43

See Michael Winter & Matthew Diebel, Reports: Federal agent’s gun used in S.F. pier shooting, USA
Today (July 7, 2015, 10:53 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/07/man-charged-san-franciso-waterfront-shooting---arraigned/29811735/ [https://perma.cc/239R-5C49].

44

See, e.g., Alicia Barrón, A Young Immigrant’s Inspiring Story of Survival Moves the Internet to Take
Action, Upworthy (July 27, 2016), https://www.upworthy.com/a-young-immigrants-inspiringstory-of-survival-moves-the-internet-to-take-action [https://perma.cc/2HH3-MGPS].

45

This is, in essence, the familiar “bubble” argument, where political polarization is driven by
partisan news sources. See Dominic Spohr, Fake news and ideological polarization: Filter bubbles and
selective exposure on social media, 34:3 Bus. Info. Rev. 150, 153 (Aug. 23, 2017).

46

See, e.g., Neil Munro, Report: Cops Arrest 80 at Mexican-Run Cockfight in Virginia, Breitbart
(June 7, 2019), https://www.breitbart.com/crime/2019/06/07/cops-arrest-80-mexican-runcockfight-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/MNP8-D97P].

47

See, e.g., Justin Glawe, Undocumented Immigrant Saved Houston Cop’s Life Before He Was Killed,
Daily Beast (Jan. 20, 2019, 12:24 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/undocumentedimmigrant-juan-carlos-salgado-saved-houston-cops-life-before-he-was-killed
[https://perma.cc/2FUF-LP3W].
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intuition. The simple paradigmatic case is a company that pays a lobbyist to present
their samples to a lawmaker. Partisan media are less directly doing the same thing.
Their customers pay them, through subscription or ad-revenue generation, to
provide samples that reinforce the customers’ beliefs. In a democracy where
lawmakers represent the views of their constituents, the reinforced belief of the
customers must be passed on to the lawmakers, whether through direct
communication between the lawmakers and constituents, political polling,
protests, or a simple vote. Ultimately, the customers of partisan media are
lobbying, even if they do not intend to. The same is of course true of consumers of
nonpartisan media. Any sample that influences the mind of a voter has some impact
on the legislative process. The sampling mechanisms merely amplify some samples
over others.
Obviously, the ability to connect lawmakers with salient bits of moral intuition
is highly prized. Lobbyists can be viewed as a biased sampling mechanism designed
to produce samples suggesting a particular story.49 A lobbyist seeking, for instance,
harsher penalties for property crimes will find the most lurid stories imaginable.
They might find dozens of stories of irreplaceable heirlooms taken or destroyed in
robberies. They might compose troubling statistics about the number of people
victimized by property crimes. With some thought, they can think of hypothetical
scenarios in which lenient penalties incentivize crime. Their samples will present a
wall of moral intuition: it is unfair to let property crimes go lightly punished. Of
course, gathering those samples is only one part of a lobbyist’s job—they must also
show the samples to lawmakers so that the lawmakers can take those samples and
create laws inspired by them.
4. The Model: Legislative Process
Once samples of moral intuition have been gathered, a model must incorporate
the samples into a reproduction of the original subject. In legal sampling,
lawmakers take the samples that reach them, draft laws inspired by those samples,
and then hand off the task of enforcement to others in the legal system.
Enforcement is so critical to the actual law that people ultimately live by that it must
be considered part of this modeling step even if it is not ordinarily viewed as part of
lawmaking. As discussed in the resources section above, the logistics of
enforcement are inextricably linked to what the actual rule can and should be.

Here, I use “lobbyist” in its informal meaning of someone seeking to influence the views of
lawmakers rather than any of its various legal or technical distinctions (e.g., one who seeks to
influence federal lawmakers but works for a state government is not technically a “lobbyist” under
the law, but we might colloquially refer to such a person as a lobbyist.)
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Legislators are influenced by the samples that reach them. Their precise motive
dictates which samples matter the most to them. In the democratic system of the
United States, some lawmakers are most influenced by statistical analyses of their
constituents. Whether these lawmakers simply want to maximize their chances of
remaining lawmakers or they hold some ideal about representing the views of their
constituents, the samples that matter most to them are polls. Some lawmakers try
to make independent decisions based on samples, though they likely consciously
seek somewhat biased samples to justify their preexisting policy inclinations. And,
of course, some lawmakers operate on what we would think of as corrupt motives,
such as a desire to obtain a cushy job with a company that would benefit from a
certain vote. Note that a non-democratic leader can have nearly the same motives
as a democratic one—represent the views of the people to minimize political
disturbance, represent their own views to satisfy some internal rationale, or act
based on some corrupt self-interest.
The literal process of drafting laws is fairly mechanistic, but warrants brief
mention. In the modern context, the task is left to specialized staff who can put in
appropriate cross-references to existing laws and carefully minimize unintended
consequences of the general idea for the law.50 These specialists sometimes make
mistakes, leading to slightly different laws than originally envisioned because not
every possibility can be foreseen in the general language used by lawmakers to
describe what they want the bill to do.51 Elected representatives ultimately oversee
this process, and simple self-interest usually prevents the drafters from sneaking in
anything too outrageous, but the fact remains that the drafters have some limited
autonomy in the process. Even when they do not consciously choose to exercise it,
their choices can affect the ultimate bill in major ways.52
5. The Model: Enforcement Process
On the enforcement side, humans have worked with legal codes long enough to
recognize that the codes themselves cannot practically deliver perfect justice in
every case (i.e., our sampling process inevitably fails to perfectly reproduce moral
intuition). Enforcement of the laws and investigation of potential violations serve

See, e.g., Deborah Beth Medows, A Beginner’s Guide to Legislative Drafting, 58:2 Harv. J. Legis.
(2016), https://harvardjol.com/2016/10/24/a-beginners-guide-to-legislative-drafting/
[https://perma.cc/L3P5-KN7U].
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See, e.g., Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993) (holding that
drafting errors can be remedied by courts when they create “obvious” mistakes).

51

52

See id.
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as subtle ways for the model to better fit moral intuition without altering the laws
themselves. This can happen in obvious ways, such as when the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security declined to prosecute an entire category of immigration law
violators.53 Much more often, however, prosecutors use their discretion to refrain
from prosecuting certain violations of the law. Similarly, police essentially do not
investigate certain kinds of violations, a decision wholly distinct from prosecutorial
discretion. These discretionary actions do not necessarily mean enforcement
officials are corrupt, merely that society at large and enforcement officials have tacit
understandings that some violations are trivial and can be disregarded in many
cases. Examples of this phenomenon include near-universal violation of speed
limits on highways and ubiquitous low-level sports gambling surrounding the
NCAA college basketball tournament.54
At the ground level, enforcement can create a more specific model for moral
intuition than the laws themselves. Take, as an example, criminal laws prohibiting
murder. The vast majority of people feel a moral intuition against murder. We are
all aware of examples of murder, whether in real life or fiction. These are our
samples for writing a basic law against murder, the simple model of our moral
intuition. Yet, for a prosecutor to have a useful definition of “murder” requires years
of study and practice in the courtroom, and even then, the definition resides in their
brain, not as a precise statement of words. A seasoned prosecutor can look at the
circumstances of a case, consider all the permutations seen over a career, and
proclaim, “This was a murder,” but even they might struggle to explain exactly why.
The determination of precise legal questions can be affected by the experience
of other actors at the enforcement level. A seasoned prosecutor and a seasoned
public defender might see the same circumstances and come to opposite
conclusions, most likely because their mental conception of murder is tinged with
samples of contextual evidence unavailable to the other party. A judge can
ultimately decide which view is more accurate, and if the judge’s verdict is
unpopular, lawmakers can rewrite the law to reduce the discretion of enforcement
officials.
The enforcement of laws over time naturally creates a sort of common law of
experience in the minds of prosecutors and police. Often this is a necessary and

See Memo, Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar et al.,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States
as Children, (June 15, 2012) (on file with author).
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See, e.g., Mark E. Terman, Yes, Your March Madness Office Bracket is Technically Illegal, 11 Nat’l
L. Rev. 236 (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/yes-your-march-madnessoffice-bracket-technically-illegal [https://perma.cc/5UDG-G6MM].
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good thing because it tweaks the legal system model to better comport with moral
intuition. At the same time, if police and prosecutors grow disconnected from the
moral intuition guiding the broader political system, new laws must be put in place
to change their procedures.55 This scenario is an unfortunate potential consequence
of specialization and generalization.
To build the refined model of moral intuition involving murder, we needed
someone (in practice, many people) to devote their time to years of study. However,
it is not feasible for one person to study all murder cases, meet all the families of
victims, and interrogate every alleged murderer. To build the working knowledge,
practitioners work from the sample of total evidence they have seen. If their
samples are not representative, they can develop dangerous and self-reinforcing
generalizations. A policeman in an urban setting might almost exclusively deal with
Black criminals and conclude that Black people commit crime disproportionately.
This conclusion is drawn from an unrepresentative sample, and that sample may be
derived from how laws have been enforced (e.g., the police have for years routinely
patrolled certain “high-crime” areas, and so the policeman in question
disproportionately experiences crime there).
The possibility of specialized prosecutors and police deviating from moral
intuition because of unrepresentative sampling is why it is generally helpful to have
non-specialist legislatures in lawmaking roles. Untainted by illusory sampling, they
can note overall law enforcement statistics, as well as other sociological data, to
overrule biased practices. Like everything else about the law, this is not a perfect or
foolproof system, but it provides a helpful way for specialist prosecutors and
generalist legislators to keep each other in check.56

This is obviously an issue relevant to the contemporary Black Lives Matter movement. See
generally Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 Yale L. J. 2054
(2017).
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Opponents of police reform movements like Black Lives Matter often allege that lawmakers
pushing for reform are cynically supporting “anti-police” measures to address illusory problems
their constituents think are true. See, e.g., John Malcolm, Book Review: The War on Cops, The
Heritage Foundation (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/
commentary/book-review-the-war-cops [https://perma.cc/XE2P-WKF3]. Those allegations are
beyond the scope of this article, but it is certainly within the realm of possibility for democratic
systems to produce bad laws because representatives are beholden to the pernicious views of their
constituents. Sampling theory is silent on the issue of whether humans can have “bad” moral
intuitions. Suffice to say, if a sufficiently large majority has a “bad” moral intuition, accurate
sampling can create “bad” laws.
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C. Deciding Sampling Levels in Law
Recall that an optimal sampling level depends on three factors: (1) available
resources; (2) purpose; and (3) complexity of the subject. These all apply to sampling
in the legal context, though they are more complicated than in an ordinary
engineering problem. The key insight from understanding optimal sampling in law
is that even if you assume law always has the same purpose and moral intuition
never changes, the inevitable change in available resources means that the best
sampling level must change over time.
1.

Technology’s Role in Sampling Levels

Technological capacity simultaneously alters the quality of samples taken and
the resources needed to obtain those samples. For example, the development of
closed-circuit television cameras have had a significant effect in reducing property
crime because they simultaneously improve the quality of samples (i.e., it is much
easier to detect crime and have some useful evidence of who did it) and reduce the
resources needed to obtain samples (i.e., cameras are cheaper than permanently
stationing a guard).57 Technological capacity can thus be thought of as the ratio of
sample quality to resource investment in a particular area of law. High
technological capacity can allow for better sampling even with fewer resources; low
technological capacity can restrict sampling options even in wealthy societies.
Increasing resource availability and sample quality allow for rules that more
closely replicate moral intuition. Body cameras provide a clear example. Before
such cameras were economically feasible, peer pressure among the police and a lack
of evidence could effectively nullify rules regarding police behavior. The efficacy of
body cameras in stopping police misbehavior is still unclear, but at the very least the
cameras have driven better documentation of police behavior and changes in
handling mentally ill suspects.58
2. Complexity of the Specific Problem: Moral Intuition
Complexity in the sampling context refers specifically to how complicated the
See Hyeon Ho Park et al., Measuring the crime displacement and diffusion of benefit effects of openstreet CCTV in South Korea, 40 Int’l J. of L., Crime, and Just. 179, 181 (2012).
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See Ashley Southall, Police Body Cameras Cited as ‘Powerful Tool’ Against Stop-and-Frisk Abuses,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/nyregion/nypd-bodycameras.html [https://perma.cc/5QQG-TPHH] (reporting study finding 40 percent increase in
reported stops by officers wearing body cameras). But see Shira Ovide, Can Body Cameras Improve
Policing?, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/07/technology/bodycameras-police.html [https://perma.cc/4ZCJ-9J7A] (criticizing that study and describing evidence
of body camera effectiveness as “mixed”).
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thing being sampled is. For a particular legal rule, the thing being sampled is moral
intuition regarding the area in question. Some moral questions are relatively
straightforward—almost every person shares the same intuition, if not the reasons
for it. Unprovoked killing and theft are two examples of such questions. It takes
relatively few samples to understand and effectively model the basic rules against
unprovoked killing and theft. The rules are thus relatively simple. Difficult cases
can and do still arise—is it theft for a starving mother to steal to feed her child?
However, the ways in which a legal system can account for those limited cases (e.g.,
prosecutorial discretion) allow the rule to closely replicate moral intuition with little
space between the two.
As in any sampling problem, laws better conform to moral intuition with more
samples. For example, if we know of only one simple murder case, with
unimpeachable evidence, we might have a simple definition of murder: wrongful
killing, always punished in turn by the death of the defendant. But as we encounter
more samples, we can see errors in that simple model where it deviates from moral
intuition. For instance, what if a defendant mistakenly thought his victim was
attacking the defendant? It is still doubtless a wrongful killing, but it seems far less
morally culpable. From such complex samples emerge lesser crimes like second
degree murder or manslaughter.
One way in which complexity is increased is high variance in moral intuition on
a particular issue. Consider an issue like abortion, about which people have wildly
varying moral intuition. 59 The laws around abortion are both complicated and
highly variable.60 Even within a single country like the United States, two similar
states right next to each other can have wildly different rules.61 A federal system
where different states can have different rules is one way of mediating complexity
in moral intuition, allowing for some minimization of the discrepancy between the
moral intuition of the citizens and the law. Many people in the federal system still
live with that discrepancy, notably, a vehement pro-life person living in a pro-choice
state, or vice-versa. A more nuanced system is theoretically possible—imagine if
every locality could have their own abortion laws, minimizing the number of people
sorted into the “wrong” jurisdiction. This sort of sampling would require greater

See Carrie Feibel, Americans Hold Complex Views on Abortion, Poll Finds, NPR (June 7, 2019,
5:19 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/07/730564605/americans-hold-complex-views-onabortion -poll-finds [https://perma.cc/G8P3-CCVJ].
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See An Overview of Abortion Laws, Guttmacher Institute, https://www.guttmacher.org/
state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/6QL8-SWQC].
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There are many companion states to choose from, but one pair would be Colorado and
Arizona. See id.
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resources, including demands on people seeking abortions to know what the rule is
in their particular jurisdiction.
Another source of complexity in moral intuition is the degree of fact
intensiveness of the moral violation. Sometimes, fact complexity renders rules
essentially unenforceable, at least through a formal legal system. Take for example
the vast array of things we consider morally objectionable but not criminal: cheating
on a spouse, breaking a promise, bullying—the precise circumstances matter so
much to the justice of the situation that we generally keep these matters outside the
criminal justice system. Other complicated bad acts are covered in the legal system,
but require resource-intensive sampling to fully stamp out. Most kinds of financial
crime fall into this category.
3. Adjustments for Purpose
In actual engineering, sampling rates depend on purpose. A low sampling rate
can be appropriate even for a complex subject and even when there are more
resources available if the purpose being served by the sampling does not require a
high-quality reproduction or if there are specific benefits to the low-sampling
approach. This is no less true in the legal context. There are some areas of law where
sampling levels are adjusted upward or downward not because of complexity of the
subject, but because the rule in question has importance disproportionate to its
complexity. Generally, the more important an area of law, the higher the sampling
rate, but there are interesting exceptions to that rule.
Relatively unimportant areas—think parking regulations—have low-sampling
rate solutions because there is little gain by making the rules better. There are many
situations where it would be fair to let someone park in a normally reserved spot.
Virtually everyone would agree to allow someone to park in a zone they do not have
a permit for if they have a medical emergency, or even if they are running late to
something important like a job interview. However, the consequences for violating
such regulations are generally low enough that we simply do not worry about those
cases. So too are areas of particular importance receive very high-sampling
solutions. Capital punishment cases routinely take over a decade from the time of
sentencing to execution as multiple appeals percolate through the legal system.62
Some rules in areas with relatively complicated moral intuition end up with a
low sampling approach because ease of comprehension of the rules is particularly
important. One example of this phenomenon is workplace safety regulation.
Critics of workplace safety regulations frequently argue that there should be more

Barry Latzer et al., Justice Delayed? Time Consumption in Capital Appeals: A
Multistate Study 17 (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 2007).
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exemptions and exceptions to the rules.63 This amounts to an argument for higher
sampling, to create rules that more precisely follow moral intuition. However,
simpler rules with fewer exceptions make education of workers subject to the rules
easier, with fewer accidents and infractions arising from workers changing jobs.
Many traffic laws also fall into this category, intended to make the laws easy to
remember rather than tailored precisely to each situation.64
These examples seem to defy the fundamental precept of sampling that
increased sampling yields an outcome closer to moral intuition, but they do not.
What they show is a conventional sampling problem where the sampling rate is
restricted by resource constraints. Normally, the resources in question are things
like money or manpower, but the relevant resource here is the processing ability of
the people guided by the rules. While more complicated rules could get closer to
moral intuition, they would do so at an unacceptable cost in processing ability. The
central tenet that increased sampling yields an outcome closer to moral intuition
remains true; it is simply not worth the cost to society to achieve that outcome in
some cases.
II.

IDENTIFYING AREAS FOR REFORM THROUGH SAMPLING THEORY

With the theory of sampling in the legal context laid out, we can use the theory
to identify and discuss laws where the process appears to have broken down or could
be improved. Sampling theory allows for a more systematic approach to reform and
a more nuanced understanding of what can or should be changed.
A. How Sampling Can Fail
Sampling failures come in three, and only three, varieties: sampling too little,
sampling too much, and taking non-representative samples. There are different
causes for each kind of failure—devoting too few resources, political obstacles to
adopting the right policy, concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, etc.—but they all
lead to one of these three types. Sample too little and the rule strays too far from
moral intuition. Sample too much and the resources needed to support high
sampling levels could be better used elsewhere. Non-representative samples
produce a warped reproduction of the original subject. Each variety is present in
the legal world today. We will quickly discuss each type, then move to more detailed
See Republicans rally around OSHA reform (again), Industrial Safety & Hygiene News (May
17, 2000), https://www.ishn.com/articles/83474-republicans-rally-around-osha-reform-again
[https://perma.cc/FC3K-UWMK].
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The standardization of speed limits within broad categories of areas (e.g., 25 miles-per-hour
in a densely populated area) is one example of this phenomenon.
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examples of each phenomenon.
1.

Under-Sampling

This is the most straightforward failure mode, resulting in rules that are
insufficiently nuanced. As discussed above, some low-sampling solutions are
necessary because of resource limitations. However, in a society that is growing
wealthier and more technologically sophisticated, there will inevitably be rules that
were once necessary accommodations because of resource limitations, but become
sampling failures. This explains, perhaps, why legal reforms often seek to add more
nuance—in a society growing wealthier, one is more likely to find under-sampling
than over-sampling.
Not every under-sampling failure has such a benign cause, of course.
Sometimes, low-sampling solutions are foolish from the outset, but are kept in
place for pretextual, ignorant, or even malevolent reasons. One 19th century law
requires bicyclists in New Jersey to have bells audible for at least 100 feet to warn
pedestrians.65 This sounds like an excessive but perhaps reasonable low-sampling
solution (lower than, say, a rule requiring bicyclists to avoid pedestrians), until one
notes that the rule is enforced very rarely. Occasions of enforcement are often
highly suspect, such as when police used the law in 2018 to pull over a black bicyclist
acting “suspiciously.” 66 Rules that became sampling failures through resource
growth can sometimes continue for nefarious reasons. Groups with less political
power will struggle to get lawmakers to update laws that have become sampling
failures.
2. Over-Sampling
Over-sampling means that the resources necessary to attain the current level of
legal fidelity to moral intuition is not worth the cost. It tends to occur in fields with
Byzantine rules, where participants must invest significantly to even understand
the rules. In benign cases, over-sampling occurs because lawmakers overestimate
the resources available. Without adequate resources, the highly nuanced rule
begins to produce undesirable results at unsustainable costs.
As with under-sampling, there can be malevolent motives for over-sampling.
The beneficiaries of over-sampling tend to be the knowledgeable middle men (e.g.,
lawyers) who help non-specialists understand the rules, and therefore have a vested
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N.J. Rev. Stat. § 39:4-11 (2013).

See Michael Waters, Hundreds of wacky, obsolete laws still exist. Why don’t more states remove them?,
Vox (Dec. 6, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/11/18/20963411/weird-oldlaws-historical-obsolete-laws [https://perma.cc/W77V-K9W3].
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interest in maintaining complexity. They can also be people who benefit from the
interaction of complicated-but-mechanistic rules, such as the myriad tax carve outs
that benefit a few very interested businesses.67
As discussed above, it is more common to see under-sampling than
over-sampling as a cause of failure in the modern legal world because increasing
wealth and technology are making low-sampling solutions less attractive.
Furthermore, in a situation where the sampling rate is too high, the fact that wealth
and technological capability are increasing means that the sampling rate was likely
already too high when the original rule was put in place. As we have seen above,
some current sampling failures were originally much more reasonable because of
resource constraints. Our forebears were less likely to enact laws that were a bad
idea at the time, though obviously such things still happen on occasion.
3. Unrepresentative Sampling
The classic unrepresentative sampling error in a legal context comes from
legislators devising a law to suit their own unique constituents, donors, or special
interests. This can be deliberate or a product of ignorance, as when a legislator is
persuaded by a few samples without understanding important other aspects of the
society’s moral intuition.
It is easy to accuse any law of having unrepresentative sampling, but “bad” laws
can accurately reflect the moral intuition of the population. “Bad” laws can also
reflect a mistaken prediction in the effects of a law that was attempting to reflect
moral intuition. As an example of the latter, consider the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, a
law that dramatically raised U.S. tariffs and worsened the effects of the Great
Depression in the 1930s. The complaints of farmers who wanted higher tariffs
drowned out the anguish of economists who knew the law would have bad effects.68
By contrast, unrepresentative sampling is a failure to sample an important part
of the population. Unrepresentative sampling is the most conceptually slippery
mode of sampling failure because malevolence can blur the line between accidental
See, e.g., Press Release, Cory Booker, N.J. Senator, Senate, Senators Booker, Lankford, Rep.
Blumenauer Seek to End Federal Tax Incentives for Professional Sports Stadiums (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/senators-booker-lankford-rep-blumenauer-seekto-end-federal-tax-incentives-for-professional-sports-stadiums [https://perma.cc/2NP5-5ZH5]
(describing a bill to disallow the use of federal-tax free municipal bonds to fund the construction
of professional sports stadiums).
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See Alan Reynolds, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression, Cato Inst. (May 7, 2016,
3:27 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/smoot-hawley-tariff-great-depression [https://perma.cc/
AZS2-ZDNV] (describing a letter signed by a thousand economists protesting the Smoot-Hawley
tariff).
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unrepresentative sampling and the society’s majority moral intuition trampling a
minority. Take, as an extreme example, American laws relating to slavery in the 19th
century. One North Carolina court held that Black people were presumptively
connected to slavery such that, in the absence of evidence, a judge could award a
possibly free Black person as a slave to a litigant. 69 Given the entire context of
popular support for slavery at the time, let us assume the rule reflected the majority
moral intuition of the white population of North Carolina. Obviously, the law would
not reflect the moral intuition of Blacks, whether free or enslaved, but Black people
were systematically unrepresented in government and comprised a little less than
one-third of the population of the state at the time of the ruling.70 There is clearly a
sampling problem in that the views of the Black population were not taken into
account, but there is every reason to think the same law would garner majority
support without the sampling failure because white people heavily outnumbered
Black people at that time. The key insight here is that not every bad law represents
a sampling failure. If a supermajority of the population holds immoral views as part
of their moral intuition, it is not a sampling failure for the law to be immoral.
Unrepresentative sampling is less likely to be benign in modern times because
of the ease of obtaining better information. There are, of course, partisan echo
chambers where one can avoid undesirable samples, but lawmakers must make a
conscious choice not to diversify their information sources. Some representatives
see themselves as representing their constituents when they write laws based on
unrepresentative samples, though the line between blind representation and
pandering is thin.71
B. How to Identify Sampling Failure in Law
True to its roots in engineering, sampling in the legal system is a pragmatic
process. It fails when it does not do what it is supposed to do: produce laws that are
as representative of communal moral intuition as resource constraints allow. In
engineering contexts, sampling failure is apparent when the reproduction
noticeably does not match the subject. There are many simple ways sampling can
fail if a technical aspect simply does not work (e.g., the lens on a digital camera is
69

Gobu v. Gobu, 1 N.C. 188, 188–89 (1802).

Kathryn L. MacKay, Statistics on Slavery, Weber S. U., https://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/
statistics_on_slavery.htm [https://perma.cc/WKD2-ALJ3].
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See, e.g., Andrew Doughman, Nevada lawmaker says he’d vote for slavery if his constituents wanted
him to, Las Vegas Sun (Oct. 28, 2013, 4:46 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2013/oct/28/statesenator-says-hed-vote-slavery-if-his-constit/ [https://perma.cc/5E6A-M4M6] (reporting a
Nevada assemblyman’s comment that he would do virtually anything his constituents wanted).
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broken.) However, the quintessential sampling failure not attributable to a
technical part simply not working is aliasing, which occurs when the sampling rate
is too low to capture the complexity of the subject. 72 Pixelation in a digital
photograph is one kind of aliasing, specifically aliasing in a spatial dimension (i.e.,
not enough samples for the physical space in which the reproduction is being
showed).73
In the legal context, sampling failure is detectable as discontent in the
community. If sampling is done correctly, there should be minimal discontent with
the law because it accurately represents the community’s moral intuition in the field
in question. “Aliasing” in the legal context is gathering an unrepresentative
sample—too few to accurately reflect moral intuition. There are, of course, a
number of other ways the process can go wrong, but as in the engineering context,
they represent a more limited technical failure. Failure can arise out of any part of
the process. There may not be adequate resources to support a chosen level of
sampling, rendering the law unenforceable. The samples themselves may be
unrepresentative or flawed. Sampling mechanisms may be unable to accurately
assess moral intuition in a particular area. The legislative or enforcement processes
may fail to accurately synthesize samples into well-crafted law.
We should not confuse sampling failure with a law simply seeming “wrong.”
Recall that sampling in law is intended to reproduce the moral intuition of the
community. A sampling failure occurs when law does not represent the moral
intuition of the community, but if an individual’s moral intuition differs from the
community’s, that is not necessarily a failure in sampling. Similarly, laws that
virtually no one would want today were not necessarily sampling failures at the time
of adoption. While the use of torture and capital punishment might be
objectionable today, their use in medieval times did not necessarily represent a
fixable sampling failure if most people’s moral intuition approved of them.
To be more than an abstractly interesting concept, sampling theory must
provide us ways to identify flaws so that we can improve the process. In order to
identify sampling problems, we must consider what specific data an observer can
point to as evidence of failure.
This is a slight simplification, but is sufficient for present purposes. Technically, aliasing
occurs when the sample rate falls below twice the frequency of a signal being sampled so that
changes in the signal cannot be accurately reproduced. This is the cause of, among other things,
helicopter blades appearing to stand still or slowly rotate in digital videos. See Barry Van Veen,
Aliasing in Movies: Levitating Helicopters and Wheels Rotating Contrary to Motion, All Signal
Processing (Apr. 3, 2017), https://allsignalprocessing.com/2017/04/03/aliasing-movieslevitating-helicopters/ [https://perma.cc/9692-JQBA].
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See Talis Bachmann, Perception of Pixelated Images 41 (2016).
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1.

Polling and its Handicaps

If sampling failure in the legal context appears as discontent in the community
subject to the law, then we must consider how one detects “discontent.” Public
opinion polling is an obvious place to start. If some aspect of the legal system was
sharply at odds with moral intuition, it would show up in polling. There are two
problems with relying on polling, however. First, polling is necessarily
rough-grained. There is relatively little polling on most legal questions, and it tends
to be very broad (e.g., how much confidence do you have in the police?).74 This is
likely because most laws do not directly affect people in a noticeable way, so only a
very broad poll will return any meaningful signal. If a poll asked, “How satisfied are
you with the current levels of punishment for larceny?” presumably very few
respondents would have a meaningful opinion. Pollsters, seeking more interest and
attention for their polls, focus on areas that more people actually think about.
The second problem with polling is that the surveyed population might not
represent the community most affected by the law in question. Take, for instance,
Gallup’s long running poll measuring confidence in the police. 75 In 2020, public
confidence in the police reached its lowest ebb in Gallup’s nearly 30 years of polling
on the question. 76 However, that low was 48 percent reporting “a great deal” or
“quite a lot” of confidence in the police. In 2017, the number was 57 percent, about
what the long-term average has been.77 So, the change from ho-hum status-quo
views of the police to the lowest confidence on record was a little less than the
change represented by polling ten appropriately randomized members of the public
and having one person change their mind, a little more than a normal polling
margin of error. 78 This at a time when there were large protests against police
behavior in virtually every major city in the country.79 Assuming Gallup’s polling
methods are correct, what this likely means is that most people have little contact
with the police, and consequently their views on police are stable.
See Megan Brenan, Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Surges, Gallup (Aug. 12,
2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/amid-pandemic-confidence-key-institutionssurges.aspx [https://perma.cc/G9Z7-FLBE] (see full set of questions).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.

Id. (follow “View complete question responses and trends (PDF download)”) (note sampling
error for this poll is plus or minus 4 percentage points).
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See generally Ray Sanchez, Black Lives Matter protests across America continue nearly 2 months after
George Floyd’s death, CNN (July 23, 2020, 1:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/23/us/blacklives-matter-protests-continue/index.html [https://perma.cc/H94Q-J6AW].

79

127

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:1 (2021)

The more informative group to poll would be people who actually do interact
with the police at least somewhat regularly.80 That group would be more sensitive
to changes and more knowledgeable about how police actually operate. Finding that
group would require conducting a larger, more expensive poll that also asked about
each respondent’s particular interactions with police, and then continuing to
conduct similar polls for years to establish trends. These are not impossible tasks,
but they would require significant resource investment over many years. The U.S.
Department of Justice does conduct some polling in this vein, but on limited
subjects and without systematic, multi-year efforts.81
A final complication on the issue of polling is that many people care very much
about rules that never directly affect them. While we can and should target polls to
the affected people, we must take some account of how strongly the non-affected
people care about the issue. It is easy to say in theory that we should discount the
opinions of the non-affected, but to do so ignores the very empathy that many say
is one of humanity’s best traits. The suffering of foreigners in distant lands and
endangered species we will never see ourselves stir our moral intuition. There are
people who are directly affected by humanitarian aid and endangered species
protection, whether through increased taxes or lost jobs, but we (appropriately, in
my view) weigh the views of people less directly affected.82
2. A Bayesian Approach to Identifying Sampling Failure
If we lack good polling data to identify sampling failures, we must look for other
evidence. There is no single unambiguous “tell” indicating a sampling failure, so we
must look at as many different sources as possible to update our estimate of the
probability of failure, a “Bayesian” approach. 83 The nested probability of seeing

In statistics, this is called “targeted sampling.” See Sean T. Allen et al., Implementing Targeted
Sampling: Lessons Learned from Recruiting Female Sex Workers in Baltimore, MD, 96 J. Urban Health
442, 442–43 (2019).
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See, e.g., Polling on Public Attitudes: Treatment of Youth in Trouble with the Law, Nat’l Juv. Just.
Net. (Oct. 2016), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/polling-public-attitudestreatment-youth-trouble-law [https://perma.cc/5558-2CAY].
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See, e.g., Daniel K. Lew, Willingness to pay for threatened and endangered marine species: a review of
the literature and prospects for policy use, Frontiers in Marine Science (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2015.00096/full [https://perma.cc/
FE3U-97D2] (describing studies of what people are willing to pay to save endangered species).
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Bayes’ theorem states that the probability of an event depends on prior knowledge of
conditions related to the event. In more practical terms, a Bayesian statistical approach involves
updating probability estimates as more information comes in based on how likely or unlikely a
given piece of evidence is if the hypothesis were true. See Rens van de Schoot et al., Bayesian
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many different hints of failure allows us to make the best possible assessment even
if no one piece of data is certain. Evidence for identifying sampling failure in law
broadly falls into one of three categories: evidence regarding public views, evidence
regarding the nature of support for the status quo, and evidence that a plausible
alternative would better represent moral intuition.
Evidence regarding public views includes:
•
•
•

Polling data (subject to the limitations discussed above);
Widespread protests against particular laws or enforcement
mechanisms; and
Diverse lobbying efforts against a particular law, or narrow efforts for
it.

Evidence regarding the nature of support for the status quo includes:
•
•
•

Sampling bias on the part of proponents;
Simplistic reasoning on the part of proponents; and
Lack of vocal support regarding the issue by proponents of current law.

These factors do not exhaust all possibilities, and many of them can be faked given
enough money or effort. However, the more a given law checks off those factors,
the likelier it is that a sampling failure has occurred.
3. Evidence Regarding Public Views
We should note at the outset that all of these indicia are essentially standing in
for a theoretical perfect poll that reveals exactly what the affected community thinks
about a given legal issue. Together, these disparate indicia can paint a picture that
at least warrants better and more expensive polling to further investigate a possible
sampling failure.
Protests are a proxy for both general views of the polity and the level of passion
against a particular law. The reasons for this barely warrant mentioning—if many
people gather together, it suggests the likelihood that many people agree, and if they
perform some illegal or socially frowned upon act, it signals their vehemence about
the issue at hand. For movements like Black Lives Matter, the Women’s March, and
various pro-Donald Trump protests, the fact that ideologically aligned protests

statistics and modelling, 1 Nature Rev. Methods Primers (Jan. 14,
https://www.nature.com/articles/s43586-020-00001-2 [https://perma.cc/Y5AM-NGPN].
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sprout up in many different places across the country suggests widespread
antagonism to the laws being protested.84
There are obvious limits to this logic. Protests might reflect separation between
a law and moral intuition, but even the largest protests generally represent a
relatively small percentage of the affected population. 85 Indeed, as populations
grow, the likelihood of even a large group of protesters representing a median
societal view declines. Additionally, as transportation costs decrease, society grows
generally wealthier and social norms against protesting weaken. Thus, assembling
a large crowd becomes both easier and less of a declarative signal. Participants in
protests also are not necessarily representative of general public sentiment. 86
Finally, while many theories of “paid protesters” or “artificial” protests are
conspiratorial, there is clearly some connection between financially-backed
logistical acumen and the size of protests, slightly weakening the inference of broad
support for causes that draw large crowds of protesters.87
Many laws do not rise to the level of popular attention, but stir heated passion
among some subset of the population. Without crowds or polling to announce
opposition to the law, evidence of sampling failure can be intuited from diverse
lobbying efforts to have the law changed. The fact of some lobbying is less important
than the diversity of opinion represented by the lobbying in question. For example,
as any staffer who works on technology-related issues on Capitol Hill can attest,
there are lobbyists on both sides of patent reform. 88 Given the vast amount of
money at stake, it should be no surprise that both sides of the debate are

See supra note 79 (discussing the different places across the country where Black Lives Matter
protests occurred).
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See, e.g., Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,
N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floydprotests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/YS3W-4D7K] (estimating that 500,000 people
participated in Black Lives Matter protests).
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Cf. Roper Center, Going Too Far: The American Public’s Attitudes toward Protest Movements (Aug.
2014), https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/going-too-far-american-publics-attitudes-towardprotest-movements [https://perma.cc/HA57-GXNL] (showing that the public rarely agrees
strongly with protesters).
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Cf. Moises Naim, Why Street Protests Don’t Work, The Atlantic (Apr. 7, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/04/why-street-protests-dontwork/360264/ [https://perma.cc/R248-ZXSR] (noting that the Occupy movement was successful
at organizing protests but did not produce much policy change).
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See, e.g., United for Patent Reform, https://www.unitedforpatentreform.com/
[https://perma.cc/59J9-QUUR];
American
Innovators
for
Patent
Reform,
http://www.aminn.org/ [https://perma.cc/X89U-7J8A].
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well-funded. 89 However, the pro-reform side is notably more diverse, including
tech companies like Google and Amazon, financial firms like Visa and the Financial
Services Roundtable, a variety of end user groups like the Home Builders
Association, etc. 90 The side favoring the status quo (or even stricter patent
enforcement) seems less diverse: holders of large libraries of legacy patents like
Caterpillar and General Electric, pharmaceutical companies, and the AFL-CIO.91
Of course, diversity in lobbying efforts can be faked with relative ease. Many
coalitions, especially if they are well-funded, can find an outlier member of the
affected community to argue the proposition that the law is not unfair. Such ruses
can often be uncovered with a minimal amount of effort; it is usually relatively easy
to tell the difference between a representative trade association and the real-life
equivalent of a throw-away social media account meant to amplify a fake message.
Diversity in lobbying efforts can help identify sampling failure even if there are
occasional successful fakes.
4. Evidence of the Nature of Support for the Status Quo
There is a fundamental obstacle in the way of anyone claiming a sampling
failure: the existing law is there because at some point someone thought it was a
correct sampling. Would-be reformers can overcome this obstacle. In the easiest
case, the law represents an outdated view that virtually no one holds. Lawmakers
willingly change the law, either because they do not hold the outdated view or
because they want to appeal to their constituencies by doing what they prefer. The
easiest case is rare, however, for simple Darwinian reasons: the easiest changes are
done quickly and quietly. On virtually any proposed change in law the public
actually cares about, there is some subset of people who support the law.
While democracy is a resilient and morally defensible system of government,
one flaw is that it cannot easily correct for vehemence of views (for shorthand, I will
refer to this as the “vehemence flaw”). If a supermajority is weakly convinced of the
righteousness of a law that oppresses a minority, the law can remain in place,
particularly if lawmakers have non-popularity-based reasons for supporting the law
(e.g., the influence of lobbyists). Many of the indicators in this section are intended
to identify laws propped up by the vehemence flaw.
The first kind of evidence suggesting a vehemence flaw is sampling bias on the
part of proponents of a given law. Citing only ideologically-aligned sources or
studies suggests the possibility of inaccurate, misleading, or non-representative
89

See United for Patent Reform, supra note 88.
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Id.
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See generally American Innovators for Patent Reform, supra note 88.
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samples. A proponent guilty of such tactics might argue that the bias of all other
sources is so strong that one can only trust ideologically-aligned outlets. This is
possible, but from a Bayesian standpoint it requires proving three propositions: (1)
non-ideologically-aligned media is biased; (2) their bias results in their failing to
present accurate samples in this instance; (3) ideologically-aligned media,
regardless of its bias, is reporting truthfully in this instance.92 It is entirely possible
that all three propositions are true in particular cases. However, such cases are rare
enough that we can safely take selective sources as an indicator of sampling failure.
Whether the proponent in question is sampling selectively with the purpose of
constructing a false case or if they are sampling ignorantly is irrelevant.
A similar logic applies to the use of simplistic reasoning by proponents of a
given law. This is not so much a sample problem as a model problem. Recall the
example of undocumented immigrants and crime, where we noted that partisans
endlessly trumpet individual cases. These sorts of arguments come with a sort of
intellectual opportunity cost. Their proponents could be offering broader statistical
arguments, augmenting or entirely replacing the rhetoric of individual cases. While
proponents of individual cases might find those stories sufficient without context,
it is also possible they are offering those cases precisely because the broader context
does not favor their point.
One final indicator of a vehemence flaw is lack of public attention to the law by
the constituents of lawmakers who ostensibly support it. The lawmakers in
question vote to support the law, but their constituents and supporters do not pay
much attention. Many generically pro-business issues fall into this category. For
example, Republican lawmakers recently supported allowing business meals as a
deductible business expense though virtually no voters were clamoring for it and
Democrats attacked the idea.93 While there may be policy reasons to support that
tax break, the median Republican voter likely did not notice or care about the
change. It is reasonable to suspect that that rule did not reflect the moral intuition
of the community so much as the policy preferences (or pecuniary pursuits) of
Republican lawmakers.
5. Evaluating a Replacement
Discontent is a necessary but not sufficient condition for identifying a sampling
failure. It is not a failure if the sampling solution in use deviates from moral
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See Rens van de Schoot et al., supra note 83.

See Jeff Stein, White House secures ‘three martini lunch’ tax deduction in draft of coronavirus relief
package, Wash. Post (Dec. 20, 2020, 9:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/
2020/12/20/meal-tax-deduction/ [https://perma.cc/23AP-3DPK].
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intuition, but remains the best option given resource constraints. The useful aspect
of sampling theory at this stage is its recognition of resource scarcity as a legitimate
reason for understanding seemingly archaic rules of the past. We discussed this
phenomenon earlier, specifically resource-based rationales for low-sampling
solutions like torture and capital punishment in medieval times. Resource
constraints still prevent the replacement of many laws that would otherwise seem
like sampling failures. For example, as previously discussed, many traffic laws are
low-sampling solutions: the speed limit is 65 miles-per-hour regardless of context.
There is likely sufficient technology now to empower an artificial intelligence to
monitor each car on the road and make a holistic evaluation of the safety of each
driver’s behavior, so that a safe driver travelling at 66 miles-per-hour is not treated
the same as an erratic driver.94 However, the resources necessary to develop and
implement that system—the artificial intelligence, cameras, and sensors—would be
astronomical. The resulting system would reflect moral intuition better in the case
of good drivers who now must grouse over receiving a seemingly unwarranted
speeding ticket, but resource constraints make the low-sampling solution by far the
better option.
C. Examples of Sampling Failure
Now that we understand sampling theory and how to identify sampling failure,
we can apply it to evaluate areas commonly under discussion as needing reform.
We can evaluate these examples by walking through the sampling process for the
original adoption of the rule, and by considering what factors may have changed or
been in error from the start. In this Article, I am deliberately choosing a wide variety
of examples to illustrate the flexibility and power of the theory, but I am by no means
exhausting all possibilities. I also do not believe that the treatment in this Article is
definitive. I merely hope that it provides a helpful way of looking at these issues,
particularly when the level of controversy makes analytical assessment difficult.
1.

Felony Murder: Sampling Too Low

The felony murder rule, familiar to many a first-year law student, allows a
prosecution to meet the intent requirement for murder if someone dies as a result
of a felony instigated by the defendant. 95 In less technical terms, it allows a

Some insurance companies use a similar system to establish premia for drivers. See Kristen
Hall-Geisler, How Do Those Car Insurance Tracking Devices Work?, U.S. News & World Report
(Aug. 27, 2021), https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/car-insurance/how-do-those-carinsurance-tracking-devices-work [https://perma.cc/3RPC-T7D6].
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See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–33 (1999) (defining felony homicide).
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prosecutor to charge a defendant with murder when the defendant commits a
felony and the victim dies as a result.96 The result is generally a major increase in
sentence from what the defendant would face for the underlying felony.97 Some
jurisdictions even allow the death penalty for defendants found guilty of felony
murder, a practice upheld by the Supreme Court in 1987. 98 Every few years, it
seems, a case arises where felony murder seems to lead to an unfair outcome,
stirring new calls for its abolition. Consider a recent case where six teenagers
burgled a house, the homeowner shot and killed one, and the other five were
charged with murder.99
Viewed through a sampling theory prism, we can ask whether felony murder is
based on an inappropriately low-sampling rate. The doctrine certainly seems like a
low-sampling solution in that it decreases the amount of investigation necessary to
convict for murder. However, the periodic discontent with felony murder suggests
that the law regularly departs from moral intuition. The question then becomes
whether a higher sampling rate—a more nuanced law—is worth increased
resources.
It is important to revisit these resource questions when the doctrine itself dates
to a period with dramatically different resources. The concept of felony murder is
often attributed to an early 18th century English legal scholar who argued that
because some offenses often lead to fights, and fights commonly lead to death, the
intent required for murder is already present in offenses leading to fights.100 It is
easy to see why felony murder may have been a better sampling solution back then.
Boiling away the moral commentary from the felony murder rule, the rule provides
for dramatically increased punishment (and, therefore, deterrence) in felony cases
where people die without a significant increase in enforcement resources. The
death rate from violence was higher than today by something like three orders of
magnitude, meaning that the potential returns to increased deterrence were far
higher.101 In that pre-industrial revolution age, there were also far fewer resources
96

Id.

Compare id. (sentence of 5-40 years confinement) with Va. Code Ann. § 18.2–86 (1975)
(creating a felony for the crime of “maliciously set[ting] fire to any wood, fence, grass, straw or
other thing capable of spreading fire on land”, with punishment of up to 5 years in prison).
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to devote to law enforcement, prisons, and the like, with real per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) approximately 1/20th what it is today.102 When the rule was
developed, the resources required for a more painstaking investigation into intent
would have seemed far larger than today, when such investigations are conducted
for most felonies. As these comparisons make clear, the resource-based arguments
for low sampling in felony murder carried far more weight.
Given that the resource situation has changed dramatically, we should consider
the evidence of sampling failure. I could find no polling on the issue of felony
murder, so we must consider the other factors described earlier in this article to
determine whether a sampling failure has occurred. There are apparent protests
against felony murder, albeit in academic journals,103 change.org petitions,104 and
the pages of newspaper editorial sections rather than in person.105
Contemporary arguments for the felony murder rule exhibit many indicia of a
sampling failure. There are relatively few open proponents of the felony murder
rule, but the few who do argue for it often make simplistic arguments that lack
connection to real evidence. To wit, proponents note that the felony murder rule
discourages the use of violence in the commission of felonies.106 But note that the
felony murder rule only matters if the perpetrator did not intend the violence that
ensued. If she did intend that violence, then she would be guilty of regular old
murder. As for being “tough on crime,” it is true that felony murder increases
penalties, but one could increase potential penalties for the underlying felony and
achieve the same deterrence result without the departure from moral intuition.107

See Our World in Data, GDP per capita in England, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/
gdp-per-capita-in-the-uk-since-1270 [https://perma.cc/LN3W-L46H].

102

See, e.g., Leonard Birdsong, The Felony Murder Doctrine Revisited, 33 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 497, 522
(2007).

103
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Given modern investigative practices, it is difficult to see how that approach
would meaningfully increase resource demands. There is also strong evidence of a
vehemence flaw in the felony murder rule. There are vocal commentators opposed
to the rule, and a generally apathetic majority unaware of the issue but generally
favoring a “tough on crime” stance that precludes abandoning the rule.108
To summarize, the sampling theory approach to felony murder provides a
practical understanding of why the rule may have made more sense when it was
adopted and why it no longer does without devolving into a morals-based
argument. A finer-grained, higher-sampling approach would better approximate
moral intuition without requiring significantly more resources.
2. The Rule Against Perpetuities: Sampling Too High
The rule against perpetuities stands as a prime example of over-sampling. It is
a doctrine so complicated as to be a running (perpetual) joke among first-year law
school students. 109 Despite the fact that the subject is widely taught in property
curricula across the country, a court has held that the rule is so unfathomable that
an attorney of ordinary skill who misunderstood it could not be held liable for
malpractice.110 Over half of states in the U.S. have adopted a simpler alternative, but
the holdouts include Texas, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, comprising a
substantial percentage of the U.S. population.111
I will summarize the rule briefly, with a minimum of jargon, but remember: the
point is that it is too complicated, so readers should feel free to skip this paragraph
and take my word for it. The rule against perpetuities limits the creation of future
interests in property. The rule prohibits creating a future interest that could “vest”
(i.e., become secure and certain) later than 21 years after a “life in being” at the time

Thesis, University of California Berkley) (As a practical matter, studies have found no deterrent
effect from the felon murder rule).
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See YouGov, Yahoo! News Covid-19 Vaccination Survey (2021), https://docs.cdn.
yougov.com/zjdg6ujrzh/20210526_yahoo_vaccine_tabs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3DB-MM5W]
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the interest was created.112 The ‘life in being’ refers to the life of a specific person
involved in the instrument (e.g., a will) that created the interest.113 That specific
person could include an unborn-but-conceived baby.114 So, for example, if Parent
A’s Will leaves a farm to Child 1 and his heirs as long as it is used to grow crops, but
if it is not, to Child 2 and her heirs, that would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities
because there is a chance the farm will stop being a farm more than 21 years after
Child 1, Child 2, and any of their heirs alive at the time Parent A’s Will went into
effect.
The rule reflects moral intuition in a very precise way. For practical reasons,
there has to be some limit on how long interests can run with land. Society would
suffer generally if land suddenly switched ownership unexpectedly two centuries
after an obscure will required the land to be used for, say, farming. However, the
general moral intuition is that dying people should not have to worry that their
specific provisions for loved ones might not come to pass because of an arbitrary
time limit. The rule against perpetuities neatly establishes that no specific, existing
beneficiary a dying person could have in mind will be cut off by the rule. To achieve
that neat adherence to moral intuition, however, requires a very high sampling rate
manifested in a rule that even competent lawyers cannot understand. The widely
enacted alternatives either substitute a flat ninety-year limit, or allows courts to
restructure wills that actually run afoul of the rule.115
The rule presents a different kind of sampling failure because it is a fairly
esoteric issue. Outside of lawyers and knowledgeable people in the real estate
industry, virtually no one knows about the rule. There is no useful polling or
protests to gauge public opinion. However, some factors are present. To the extent
there is lobbying against the rule, it is diverse. The Uniform Laws Commission, a
non-partisan entity, has spearheaded successful reform efforts across the
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country. 116 Many legal commentators have called for reform. 117 In New York,
legislators have been trying to pass a reform bill since at least 2009.118 I could not
find any useful information about support for the rule, suggesting the sort of quiet
support indicative of a sampling failure. There must be some support, or else these
reform efforts would have already come to fruition everywhere. 119 My only
speculative observation is that prominent holdout states like New York, Texas, and
New Jersey have many attorneys and a great deal of interest in property law,
suggesting there may be persuasive private lobbying.
3. The Tarasoff Rule: Well-Intentioned Over-Sampling
Judicially-created doctrines are subject to the same sampling issues as laws.
Legal scholars have observed a tendency for judicially-created doctrines to evolve
away from simple rules toward “totality of the circumstances” and “reasonable
person” tests over time. This can be thought of as a move from low to high sampling.
As we have discussed above, it is not at all inappropriate for doctrines to become
more complex as society becomes wealthier and can afford higher sampling
solutions. However, in some areas of the law, complicated doctrines can run into
resource difficulties.
The Tarasoff rule in tort law is an area where courts arguably increased the
sampling rate too high, resulting in unsustainable demands on the capacity of
psychiatrists and the legal system to adapt to a vague standard. In Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California, the California Supreme Court held that a psychologist
has a duty to exercise due care to warn foreseeable potential victims facing serious
danger from a client.120 In that particular case, the psychologist was treating a man

The effectiveness of their campaign was doubtless aided by lobbyists seeking to avoid
generation-skipping transfer taxes. While this would usually be the sort of parochial interest
signaling a potential sampling failure, the fact that it did not comprise all of the drive for reform
makes it less important here. See Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?,
40 Pepp. L. Rev. 1291, 1304 (2013).
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who confided an intent to kill a woman who did not return his affection. 121 The
psychologist contacted the police, but not the woman, and the client subsequently
killed the woman.122
Clearly, the Tarasoff rule comports with moral intuition better than
psychologists ignoring the dangers posed by their clients, but the rule’s complexity
challenges our legal and mental health system’s capacity to implement it. Tarasoff’s
complexity arises from two aspects: (1) the maximized discretion accorded to courts
by the vagueness of the rule itself; and (2) the competing duty of confidentiality for
clients.
On vagueness, courts have varied tremendously in evaluating how specific and
foreseeable the danger must be for a mental health professional to start issuing
warnings. In a Delaware case, a schizophrenic patient drove his car into oncoming
traffic, killing another driver, nearly six months after a state hospital had
discharged him as no longer psychotic.123 The court found that his psychiatrist at
the hospital was liable for failing to exercise due care for the public at large since the
psychiatrist was aware of the patient’s potential for danger.124 Compare that result
to a case in Georgia where a violent youth escaped a psychiatric facility and fatally
shot a man in order to steal his truck.125 Nobody from the psychiatric facility warned
the police that the escaped patient had homicidal tendencies, but the court found
no liability.126
The intersection of the duty of confidentiality and the Tarasoff rule is difficult to
spot precisely because both duties are intensely fact specific and nebulous. In
Pennsylvania, a plaintiff sued her psychiatrist for malpractice after she told the
psychiatrist she would “blow up and hurt somebody very seriously” if harassment at
her job continued. 127 The psychiatrist wrote a legalese-heavy warning to the
plaintiff’s supervisor.128 The court held that the warning constituted malpractice.129
The common theme to over-sampling failures is lack of resources, but it is easy
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to forget that resource constraints represent tradeoffs. The Tarasoff rule and its
permutations are complicated, but they are comprehendible given enough time and
study. States could, in theory, create specialty courts steeped in the nuances of
psychiatric ethics. They could also mandate that mental health professionals
exhaustively study different fact patterns so that they can more reliably guess what
a judge might say about each case. Those are utopian suggestions, however. Society
would have to devote far more resources to mental health professionals if they are
to spend a substantial portion of their time studying legal rules as opposed to
making money or helping people. Similarly, to create specialty courts, society
would have to pay to train specialty judges and lawyers. Again, this is possible, but if
the various levels of government are not willing to raise taxes to increase spending
to make it happen, then the Tarasoff rule will not be effectively implemented. A
high-sampling rate is a failure if society is not willing to devote the resources
necessary to make it successful. This is not a condemnation of society—if the choice
is between, say, universal education and getting the Tarasoff rule exactly right, I
suspect most people would prefer society devote resources to universal education.
As a coda to this particular failure, we should note that, in response to lobbying
by mental health professionals, most states have passed statutes attempting to give
guidance on the issue, and to grant safe harbor from breach of confidentiality claims
for good-faith warnings.130 This is a way of reducing sampling to a more sustainable
level, allowing mental health professionals to focus more intently on their
profession instead of comprehending the endless permutations of the Tarasoff
rule.131
4. Roman Catholic Diocese: Willful Under-Sampling
The reverse problem of Tarasoff can be seen in areas where there are relatively
few cases, but much philosophical interest in boiling complicated issues down to
rules. This should be understood as a low sampling solution, but under some
circumstances, it can be under-sampling. We could more closely approximate
moral intuition with a more nuanced test with small resource cost, but for various
reasons the decisionmakers want to issue the clearest possible guidance.
Sometimes, the stated goal is allowing for easier application by lower courts and

See Matthew F. Soulier et al., Status of the Psychiatric Duty to Protect, Circa 2006, 38 J. Am. Acad.
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litigants.132 At other times, the goal seems to be to demonstrate disregard for the
status quo for political reasons or to facilitate a legal challenge to the existing rule.133
Finally, sometimes, the motive seems to be to set a mechanistic rule that will be
difficult for ideological foes to get around. That last motive seems to be at work in
the recent Supreme Court free-exercise case, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo.134
In Roman Catholic Diocese, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction against New
York’s rules restricting attendance at religious services during the coronavirus
pandemic.135 New York’s restrictions limited religious service attendance to a fixed
number for religious institutions in “red” or “orange” zones denoting higher risk of
Coronavirus spread. 136 Religious institutions were not the only kinds of
organizations with restrictions in those zones—public lectures, concerts, and
theatrical performances in red zones had even tighter restrictions. 137 Businesses
deemed essential such as grocery stores had lighter restrictions.138 In enjoining New
York’s restrictions, the Court held in a per curiam opinion that the restrictions
violated the Free Exercise Clause because they “single out houses of worship for
especially harsh treatment.”139 The orders were not neutral on their face in that they
applied a specific limit to houses of worship. The Court therefore accorded the rules
strict scrutiny, finding that though stopping the coronavirus spread was a
compelling government interest, the rule was not narrowly tailored because it could
have limited attendance based on the capacity of the building rather than a fixed
number.140
The Court under-sampled in this case, creating an excessively simple rule of
neutrality in which any law that specifies houses of worship requires strict scrutiny
Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 242 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
the new test for deference to agency interpretation of law as “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances
test’” and predicting its “principal effect will be protracted confusion.”).
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to justify. The Court decided here that because there are non-religious institutions
like grocery stores in the same red or orange zone that have lighter restrictions, the
rules must be harsher against religious institutions. In fact, the rules for houses of
worship were less strict than the rules for similar non-religious institutions.
Because mass singing, talking at length, and close contact spread coronavirus, the
comparable non-religious institutions are things like theaters, not things like
grocery stores.141 The majority’s free exercise rule is much easier to apply because it
does not require any examination of the relevant facts to establish neutrality, but it
achieves that simplicity by ignoring relevant distinctions between religious and
non-religious institutions.
This case stands out as an example of false economy in sampling, precisely the
opposite problem as the Tarasoff rule, which offered an illusory perfect adherence to
moral intuition. Roman Catholic Diocese uses a simple rule, which will be easy to apply
for lower courts. However, a more complicated rule would better accord for moral
intuition with a negligible increase in effort. Neutrality can be assessed in
comparison with similarly situated entities, not just in the abstract.
There is ample evidence of sampling failure in the majority argument by our
normal criteria. The majority’s reasoning is simplistic. It defies reason to think the
free exercise clause was intended to require strict scrutiny any time some
non-religious institution gets a benefit that a religious institution does not.142 The
majority opinion omits any discussion of the key differences between religious
services and non-religious essential businesses like grocery stores, the actual reason
there would be a difference in treatment. Singing and talking in large, mostly
stationary groups in close quarters inside for at least an hour predictably spreads
Coronavirus, while short trips in a grocery store with minimal talking or interaction
with other people does not. Instead of engaging with the relevant scientific
questions, the majority fatuously noted that “there is no evidence that the applicants
have contributed to the spread of [Coronavirus].”143 Of course there was no such
evidence—their services had been restricted! Even if the services had not been
restricted, only effective contact tracing could establish conclusively that someone
had contracted the Coronavirus at their service and contact tracing has often been

141

Id. at 73 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

To use an extreme example, no one has ever claimed the free exercise clause should apply to
draft exemptions because some non-religious exemptions (e.g., the “4-G” designation for the sole
surviving son where all other sons in the family have been killed in action) are more categorically
exempting than some religious exemption (e.g., the “2-D” ministerial students exemption, which
only defers draft, not exempts it entirely).

142

143

141 S. Ct. at 76.

142

LAW AND SAMPLING THEORY

woefully ineffective in the U.S. during the pandemic.144
In this instance, polling also suggests a misfit between the Roman Catholic
Diocese majority rule and moral intuition. Only 13 percent of service-attending
Americans in a July 2020 poll said their house of worship should be open to the
public in the same way it was before the pandemic.145 In another poll, a plurality of
48 percent said services should not be allowed at all, with another 42 percent saying
services should be allowed only with restrictions.146
This case is emblematic of broader sampling problems in Supreme Court
interpretations—a fixation on rules vs. standards.147 Too often, that debate breaks
down into some (often conservatives) arguing in favor of rules and others (often
liberals) arguing in favor of nuanced standards. The pro-rules crowd cite
predictability and ease of application; the pro-standards side expounds on unfair
applications of the rule. Sampling theory helps illustrate what everyone knows
intuitively: whether rules or standards are preferable depends entirely on the
circumstances. The Roman Catholic Diocese decision is rule-like in a life-or-death
situation where the returns to nuance are high and the returns to simplicity are
relatively low. While many cases involving state-level restrictions relating to the
Coronavirus pandemic reach the Supreme Court, there are far fewer Free Exercise
cases than there are, say, criminal law cases involving probable cause. The cost to
society as a whole of having a more nuanced rule is negligible in terms of
administration. The benefit to a simpler rule in a case like this is simply that the
side preferred by many of the justices will have an easier time winning.148
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5. The Copyright Term Extension Act: Unrepresentative Sampling
As discussed above, unrepresentative sampling occurs when lawmakers act to
address the concerns of some segment of the population, but miss an important
strain of the public’s moral intuition. There are many possible examples to choose
from here, many of which fall along partisan lines.149 However, unrepresentative
sampling can happen because of political failure—that is, the interests of some
people simply are not incorporated into the lawmaking process. This is the failure
that created the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), better known as the
“Mickey Mouse Protection Act.” 150 The CTEA is easily summarized: it extended
copyrights for 20 years.151
As the nickname suggests, the CTEA’s sampling was straightforward: Disney
and artists who maintained valuable stakes in existing copyrights. Many people
called it the Mickey Mouse Protection Act because Disney was facing the imminent
expiration of its copyrights on Mickey Mouse, Goofy, Pluto, Donald Duck, and many
other characters.152 Consequently, Disney lobbied heavily for an extension, allowing

Religious Freedom, Alliance Defending Freedom (Oct. 7, 2020), https://adflegal.org/blog/
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It is understandable that highly partisan laws will not reflect a major portion of moral
intuition because partisan laws tend to be passed very narrowly, and thus need not reflect all
interests of the society. This is not to say there are no good partisan laws, but rather that if a law
is partisan, it will naturally already lack the support of nearly half the country. Such a law can
easily omit minor changes that would make it better fit the moral intuition of people represented
by the other side, so to speak.
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it to continue excluding others from profiting from the characters.153 Disney was
not the only interested party; a number of other successful artists or their estates
lobbied on the issue. 154 The commonality of interests was obvious: extending
copyrights meant an unearned windfall for a discrete set of already very wealthy
people and companies.155
What segment of the population’s moral intuition was not sampled? Anyone
who benefits from works being in the public domain, which is to say, the public writ
large. Because the public was largely unaware of the bill and its implications, its
moral intuition could be safely ignored. We can make some safe assumptions about
its likely reaction by considering some of the implications of blanket copyright
extensions:
•
•
•

Fewer songs that can be used by church hymnals, high school bands,
and local orchestras;
Fewer books or movies starring beloved characters; and
Fewer creative new uses of characters in the broad public
consciousness.

In exchange for those dubious benefits, the public received the honor of continuing
to pay monopoly prices for Disney products.
Many indicators of sampling failure are present in this case. Proponents
offered simplistic reasoning, consisting of unspecific homilies about the need to
reward creativity, as well as vague notions of “harmonizing” U.S. and European law
copyright durations despite the continuation of all existing substantive differences
(and even some differences in duration). 156 The bill engendered relatively little
interest in the broader public, but a diverse range of academics and economists
across the political spectrum criticized it.157
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The outcome reflected the selective sampling. There was not a single vote
against the bill in the Senate Judiciary Committee, nor when it was considered by
the full Senate. 158 The House of Representatives—including a then-57-year-old
representative named Bernie Sanders—passed the bill by voice vote, that is to say,
unanimously.159 While detailed political discussions are beyond the scope of this
Article, by all appearances, Republicans were happy to blindly support property
owners, and Democrats were happy to support the particular class of property
owners that donated heavily to Democrat causes.
D. Recommendations for Improving the Sampling Process
We can and should rectify specific sampling failures, but with a proper
understanding of what can go wrong in the sampling process, there are ways to
improve sampling more broadly. Tracing a path through the process diagram, there
are ways to make each step more efficient or effective.
1.

Publicly-Funded Surveys to Improve Our Understanding of Moral
Intuition

One aspect of sampling that could easily be improved is funding a more
systematic examination of the public’s moral intuition on a wide range of issues.
Many aspects of society’s moral intuition are essentially mysteries. Private entities,
both for-profit and not-for-profit, tend to focus on the political issues of the day.160
However, as this Article discusses at length, the public’s moral intuition can be
sampled much more directly to better guide lawmakers. On some issues, that would
mean broad public polling. On others, specific surveys and even focus groups would
provide important reference points for lawmakers.
Public surveys occupy a strange space in the current legal system. The federal
government funds some polling and surveys, but not systematically, and not in an
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effort to identify areas for reform. 161 Meanwhile, partisan lawmakers and their
allies fund endless private polls measuring every slight shift in views on hot-button
political issues and prominent politicians. 162 Lawmakers frequently use those
private polls as guides for achieving partisan ends in the most popular way possible,
selectively leaking the polls that make their ideas seem representative of moral
intuition. 163 Given that polling already occupies such a central place in the
lawmaking system, funding publicly available surveys would: (1) provide better
information on society’s moral intuition to lawmakers on issues outside their
narrow self-interest; (2) help coordinate lobbying on issues about which the public
might be unknowingly united; and (3) create a nonpartisan frame of reference.
The discomfort with such a proposal would likely stem from the sense that the
federal government was not set up to solicit the public’s views in such a direct way.
We allow the public to have their say at the ballot box, and then their representatives
make laws that are supposed to reflect their own wisdom rather than the public’s
fickle preferences.164 To call this view utopian is an understatement. Lawmakers
frequently use private polling on specific bills and issues so that they can tweak their
messaging strategies. Funding publicly available polling would only alter that
dynamic inasmuch as the public would have a better understanding of the samples
being used by lawmakers. Some lawmakers would undoubtedly continue to behave
in exactly the same way even if there was more nuanced information available about
public attitudes, but lobbying efforts and the activities of more principled
lawmakers would be affected by a finer appreciation of society’s moral intuition.
Further weakening the argument against funding better surveys, several bad
attributes of our current lawmaking system—partisanship, susceptibility to special
interests, lack of interest in solving problems—stem from the various workarounds
our system of government has developed for establishing common moral intuition
in ways other than public survey. Modern political parties are the product of a
Darwinian process that optimized them for obtaining and keeping power. That
objective sometimes corresponds with representing the public’s moral intuition,
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but often it does not. On many issues, most of the public has no strong opinion.
Political parties exist as the structure of a bucket containing one side of the issues
about which voters care (e.g., healthcare access, abortion, taxes, etc.) and one side
of the issues about which voters generally do not care, but some combination of
special interests do (e.g., copyright law and trade policy).165 Voters can only select
one bucket or the other, and they are generally loyal to their bucket. Lawmakers, in
turn, are selected by their parties to represent their bucket with minimal defection.
Any issue about which voters do not broadly care can be swept along with the issues
they do care about with the victorious bucket.166 The problem is that these issues
can be matters of vast import to a smaller portion of the electorate such that the law
should reflect their views. This is the vehemence flaw discussed earlier in the
article. Better surveys of public attitudes would build awareness of these issues and
possibly incentivize lawmakers to address them, if only to reap a political harvest of
which lawmakers were previously unaware.
2. Consistently Update Laws
As sampling theory makes clear, it is virtually inevitable that laws become
sampling failures over time due to increasing wealth and technology. Rather than
allow injustice to accumulate over time until a crisis point is reached, state
legislatures should, at regular intervals, consider and adopt reforms for various
fields of law, even when those fields are not at the forefront of public consciousness.
Several of the examples discussed above fall into that category, such as the Tarasoff
rule, the Rule Against Perpetuities, and, arguably, copyright law.
The idea that there could be non-controversial reforms may seem antiquated.
For entirely understandable reasons, lawmakers’ incentives can turn anything into
partisan politics. If a reform threatens particular interests, that interest group will
donate to and lobby the other political party. If there is no lobby against the reform,
the opposition political party will have an incentive to gum up the works anyway so
that the governing party will not have an accomplishment to wave before the voters.
However, for updating fairly esoteric laws like the Rule Against Perpetuities, the
immediate political benefit is fairly muted, which also limits the benefits of
demagoguing them. The political benefit would come from the overall
accomplishment of carrying out dozens of modernizing reforms. Only a very wellorganized opposition could successfully stop all such efforts without seeing
noteworthy defections to gather some of the eventual credit.
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3. Consciously Consider Samples
An obvious inference from discussion of the sampling process is that lawmakers
should base their decisions on diverse, representative samples. No conceivable
mandate for lawmakers to consider a representative range of samples would
actually work and be enforceable. However, there are creative ways to incentivize
wider sampling. For example, partisan media outlets prioritize partisan signaling,
but public institutions can use their reach to reward thoughtfulness. Consider if
congressional leadership organized an actual, televised, weekly one-hour debate on
a set issue. Ambitious senators and representatives might try to get involved in such
an endeavor if it came with an audience. For that matter, what if federal agencies
offered to buy advertising from popular commentators if they engage in public
debates on the issues of the day? We tend to shy away from the government
subsidizing some views, but if we truly believe that information silos and partisan
media is a problem, why should we not act to counter it by incentivizing
thoughtfulness?
CONCLUSION

Sampling theory has much to say about the lawmaking process. Many
arguments about laws boil down to seemingly immovable moral differences or
categorical pronouncements about right and wrong. Viewing lawmaking through
the sampling prism permits a more neutral approach. It allows us to diagnose and
fix problems without declaring opponents to be evil. Sampling theory achieves this
end not by pretending to remove morality from law, but by pinpointing more
precisely whose morality matters—the morality of the public writ large. Keeping
this end in mind allows a more engineering-like approach to lawmaking.
The insights of law and engineering seem, at first glance, to be wholly different.
Engineering is fundamentally pragmatic, accurately summarized as: “If it works, do
it.” Law, based as it is on morality, must reflect the various beliefs people have on
the most difficult ethical questions we face. If law could be summarized in a
sentence, it would be, “Do the right thing, whatever the cost.” However,
engineering only seems amoral because it often deals with ends everyone agrees are
good things—keeping a building standing, strengthening a wireless internet signal,
etc. Similarly, the legal discourse’s focus on morality and what seems fair belies all
the ways law must compromise for the sake of resource constraints in its
representation of moral intuition. Sampling theory offers a way to view law as more
akin to engineering. If we accept the democratic premise that we are trying to
reflect society’s moral intuition, we become legal engineers, trying to find better
ways to represent moral intuition in law given our current resource constraints. We
149

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

20:1 (2021)

can use evidence to identify failure, pinpoint where in the sampling process the
failure occurred, and evaluate possible replacements.
A legal engineering perspective promotes a more constructive approach to
lawmaking. Many legislative debates proceed along partisan lines, using either
facts devoid of context or moralistic arguments that cannot be proven or disproven.
Each side is left shaking its collective head, wondering why the other does not
acknowledge, for example, the horror of crime or the tragedy of overincarceration.167 Sampling theory allows each side to be more precise in its critiques
and allows for falsifiable claims. Each step of the sampling process can be measured
separately. Moral intuition can be examined through polling results and surveys.
The number and nature of samples and sampling mechanisms used by different
sides can be compared to check for how representative they are.
The sampling approach also helps us better understand our forebears, and why
rules that seem obviously wrong now were almost universally accepted in the past.
It is easy to chalk up such differences to changing norms (i.e., moral intuition of the
public changing), but sampling theory offers possible alternatives: technological
and resource constraints raised the cost of doing what we now consider to be
morally right. Similarly, even if technological and resource constraints were less
pressing than in the past, the relevant laws could be holdovers from an earlier era
that lawmakers had not yet changed. This perspective offers a reasonable middle
ground between exculpating all crimes of the past and disowning every public figure
born before about 100 years ago. Some historical figures deserve more scorn for
continuing to actively enact and support laws we now widely view as morally
repugnant, others were swept along by the public’s moral intuition, resource
constraints, and inheriting laws that became sampling failures.
The logic of sampling theory can also give us a glimpse into the future,
assuming resource and technological growth continues. Given, say, the ability to
grow meat cheaply in a lab, can anyone doubt that societies of the future will deem
factory-style animal husbandry immoral and outlaw it accordingly? If robotic
processes bring down the price of housing, can anyone doubt that future
generations will view our levels of homelessness as unforgivable? Understanding

167

See, e.g., Tom Cotton, How the Senate First Step Act is Flawed, Wash. Times (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/29/how-the-senate-first-step-act-isflawed/ [https://perma.cc/LX8H-Q48R]; Press Release, Cory Booker, N.J. Senator, Senate, Booker
Statement on Senate Passage of Landmark Criminal Justice Reform Bill, (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-statement-on-senate-passage-oflandmark-criminal-justice-reform-bill [https://perma.cc/7UK9-CTPA].

150

LAW AND SAMPLING THEORY

the interplay between sampling and resource growth should give us a better
perspective on earlier generations and urge us to consider reforms before we too
find ourselves condemned by our descendants.
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